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INTRODUCTION 
Modern public law is strongly devoted to the notion that 
public officials should be held “accountable” for their decisions.1 
This is not surprising because the legitimacy of governmental 
authority in a democracy is often thought to depend upon the 
consent of the governed.2 Although a very general form of dem-
ocratic consent and political accountability is arguably achieved 
by holding periodic elections whereby a majority of voters select 
candidates to represent them for a fixed term in office, modern 
public law theory and doctrine have increasingly demanded 
more from these concepts.3 Specifically, voters must be able to 
hold public officials accountable for their specific policy choices 
to ensure that those decisions are consistent with the prefe-
rences of a majority. Moreover, in what might be considered op-
timistically circular reasoning, modern public law typically pre-
sumes that elected officials are politically accountable for their 
specific policy decisions because they are selected and poten-
tially removed from office by the voters.  
This Article draws on recent interdisciplinary scholarship 
from law and political science, which demonstrates that the lat-
ter empirical presumption is simply not the case.4 Public offi-
cials are not held politically accountable for their specific policy 
decisions pursuant to periodic elections, and there are over-
whelming reasons to believe that this will never be the case. 
Moreover, in the absence of a reliable enforcement mechanism, 
modern public law’s efforts to legitimize government authority 
by connecting specific policy decisions to the will of the majority 
are bound to be misplaced. 
 
 1. See Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-
Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2073 (2005) (recognizing that 
“[t]he idea of accountability is very much in fashion in legal and political  
thought these days,” and that “the term is used in a variety of different ways”).  
 2. See Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 
HARV. L. REV. 434, 442 (1998) (explaining that under theories of popular sove-
reignty, “a regime is legitimate if people are made to follow only those rules to 
which they have consented”).  
 3. See infra notes 16–40 and accompanying text.  
 4. See infra Parts II, IV.A. For leading interdisciplinary sources on this 
point, see Jane S. Schacter, Political Accountability, Proxy Accountability, and 
the Democratic Legitimacy of Legislatures, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH 
45, 47 (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006); and Ilya Somin, Politi-
cal Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on 
the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287, 1304–29 
(2004).  
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The Article turns to deliberative democratic theory to iden-
tify an alternative means of legitimizing governmental authori-
ty and holding public officials accountable for their decisions.5 
Specifically, it contends that individual policy choices are de-
mocratically legitimate to the extent that they are supported by 
public-regarding explanations that could reasonably be ac-
cepted by free and equal citizens with fundamentally different 
interests and perspectives. Accordingly, public officials can be 
held deliberatively accountable by a requirement or expectation 
that they give reasoned explanations for their decisions that 
meet those criteria. 
Legal scholarship on the concept of democratic accountabil-
ity is surprisingly undeveloped in light of the importance of this 
topic for modern public law theory and doctrine.6 Moreover, the 
best scholarship in this area tends simply to challenge existing 
assumptions or focus solely on questions of democratic theory.7 
This Article builds upon the existing work in a concrete and 
comprehensive way by connecting legal theory and doctrine, po-
litical science, and democratic theory on the concept of demo-
cratic accountability to question the prevailing status quo and 
propose an alternative way of thinking about the matter. Spe-
cifically, it (1) explains that modern public law theory and doc-
trine are currently dominated by a particular paradigm of polit-
ical accountability; (2) demonstrates that the prevailing 
paradigm is empirically implausible; and (3) sets forth an al-
ternative paradigm of deliberative accountability that is both 
more realistic and normatively attractive. Finally, the Article 
claims that the deliberative accountability paradigm should be 
made paramount and discusses the implications of doing so for 
public law theory and doctrine. These implications range from 
the elimination of the countermajoritarian difficulty, to the re-
jection of unitary executive theory and unduly formal methods 
of statutory interpretation, to a refined conception of judicial 
review of agency action, and to deep concerns about the legiti-
macy of the ballot initiative process. The Article closes by pro-
viding a tangible example of the implications of a paradigm 
shift in our understanding of democratic accountability for in-
 
 5. See infra Part III.  
 6. See Jane S. Schacter, Ely and the Idea of Democracy, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
737, 755 (2004) (“Accountability . . . has gotten a fairly easy pass in the legal 
scholarship on democracy and constitutionalism.”).  
 7. For outstanding contributions in each of these genres, see, respective-
ly, Schacter, supra note 4, at 45–47, and AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996). 
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dividual rights that focuses on the controversy over same-sex 
marriage. The example illustrates that some legal or policy out-
comes would change if there was an obligation to justify them 
on the merits, rather than by resorting to the alleged need to 
defer to officials who are “politically accountable,” which it 
turns out, upon examination, is typically false. 
I.  THE DOMINANCE OF THE POLITICAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY PARADIGM   
One can hardly read a judicial opinion in a controversial 
case or a law review article on a public law topic these days 
without encountering some rhetoric about the need for, or value 
of, democratic accountability. In judicial opinions, the standard 
technique is for decision-makers who uphold governmental ac-
tion to justify their conclusions at least in part on the basis of 
the need to defer to choices made by democratically accountable 
officials.8 This technique is invariably accompanied by a criti-
que of any opposing judges for seeking to impose their personal 
preferences on the electorate, despite the democratically unac-
countable status of the federal judiciary.9 Similarly, it has be-
come a truism in contemporary legal scholarship that policy de-
cisions should be made by democratically accountable 
officials.10 Any scholar who advocates a meaningful role for un-
 
 8. See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 388 (1996) (“[J]udges occupy a 
unique and limited role, one that does not allow them to substitute their views 
for those in the executive and legislative branches . . . who have the constitu-
tional authority and institutional expertise to make these uniquely nonjudicial 
decisions and who are ultimately accountable for these decisions.”). 
 9. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 
190–91 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (claiming that the FDA’s statutory au-
thority to regulate tobacco should have been upheld, partly because the re-
sponsible administrative officials and their elected supporters would be held 
politically accountable for a policy decision of this magnitude); Romer v. 
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652–63 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the ma-
jority’s decision to invalidate a policy choice by “the people of Colorado” on the 
grounds that “it [is] no business of the courts (as opposed to the political 
branches) to take sides in [a] cultural war” and claiming that the decision was 
“an act, not of judicial judgment, but of political will”). 
 10. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and 
Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 480 (2003) 
(“Post-Bickel, scholars began to distrust not only judicial use of individual 
rights to invalidate popularly enacted statutes, but any policy decision made 
by unelected officials.”); Jonathan T. Molot, Ambivalence About Formalism, 93 
VA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2007) (identifying efforts to “minimize judicial intrusions into 
the political process” in different fields of modern public law in response to the 
core problem of justifying judicial authority in “a post-realist age . . . when 
judging is understood to be an active, creative enterprise”). 
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elected officials in making discretionary policy choices is there-
fore automatically on the defensive, because it is widely be-
lieved that such a position demands heightened justification. 
Although the meaning of “democratic accountability” is 
deeply contested and increasingly debated in the social 
sciences,11 legal scholars have devoted surprisingly little atten-
tion to the issue.12 The vast majority of legal commentators 
have simply equated democratic accountability with political 
accountability and presumed that policy-making authority is 
most legitimately exercised by elected representatives of the 
people.13 This Part describes the existing political accountabili-
ty paradigm, explains how it is currently dominating every do-
main of contemporary public law, and describes the prevailing 
hierarchy of perceived institutional competence that has 
emerged.  
It is important to recognize at the outset that the idea of 
political accountability could be understood to operate at two 
very different levels of abstraction. On a general level, political 
accountability simply means that the electorate has an oppor-
tunity to select a representative and decide whether to retain 
that person in office at the end of a specified term. General po-
litical accountability of this nature exists, by definition, when-
ever public officials must stand for election. Elections, moreo-
ver, are an essential element of democracy because they 
provide a means for achieving a peaceful and orderly succession 
from one governing regime to another,14 in addition to allowing 
voters to protect themselves from abuses of power by their own 
representative government and ensuring that the existing lea-
dership can plausibly claim to have the consent of the go-
verned.15 The general political accountability that is provided 
 
 11. See, e.g., DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION (Adam 
Przeworski et al. eds., 1999); PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY (Michael W. Dowdle 
ed., 2006). The latter volume includes some contributions by legal scholars. 
 12. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.  
 13. See Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 
98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 532 (1998) (“The vast majority of theorists have failed 
to challenge [Alexander] Bickel’s basic assumption, that political accountabili-
ty is the sine qua non of legitimacy in government action.”); infra notes 20–23 
and accompanying text. 
 14. See Rubin, supra note 1, at 2077 (“One of the most important func-
tions that elections do serve is to solve the problem of succession.”).  
 15. See Brown, supra note 13, at 565 (“Elections provide the people with 
an opportunity to punish [representatives] who have violated their duty by in-
vading the liberties of the people.”). For a comprehensive development of this 
point, see id. at 565–71.  
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by elections is therefore undeniably central to democracy, but it 
does not tell us very much about the requisite link between the 
policy preferences of the voters and the specific policy choices of 
their elected representatives, or the extent to which specific 
policy decisions could legitimately be made by unelected public 
officials.  
The prevailing paradigm of modern public law has moved 
beyond a concern with general political accountability and fo-
cuses instead on a perceived need to ensure that public officials 
are politically accountable to a majority of the electorate for 
their specific policy decisions. This extension of the requisite 
scope of political accountability is almost certainly a reflection 
of several related developments in legal and political theory.16 
First, legal realism demonstrated that most legal rules are the 
result of choices by authoritative decision-makers rather than 
objectively ascertainable truths.17 Shortly thereafter, pluralism 
emerged as the leading theory of American democracy, whereby 
the political process was conceived as a marketplace in which 
selfish private interests compete for resources.18 These intellec-
tual movements combined to generate a newfound commitment 
to the principle of majority rule: if there is no objectively ascer-
tainable “public good,” and participants in the political process 
are merely seeking to satisfy their own subjective preferences, 
then the only legitimate way to make policy decisions that are 
binding on everyone is to follow the wishes of a majority of the 
citizens.19 Governmental officials can therefore only legitimate-
ly make public policy decisions on behalf of the electorate if 
they implement the majority’s preferences. Because public offi-
cials would otherwise have overwhelming incentives to stray 
 
 16. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term—Foreword: 
The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 66–68 (1989) (describing 
these developments).  
 17. For an iconic decision that signified acceptance of this view by the Su-
preme Court, see Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 18. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 145–
48 (1956) (discussing the role of special interest groups in the making of gov-
ernment decisions).  
 19. See Chemerinsky, supra note 16, at 68 (“If courts cannot discern true 
values, because none exist, and if majoritarian decisionmaking is the ideal, 
judicial review is nothing but the substitution by unelected judges of their 
values for those of popularly elected legislatures.”); see also Brown, supra note 
13, at 538–39 (documenting the historical development and recent dominance 
of “the majoritarian paradigm” in constitutional theory and explaining that for 
its adherents, “democratic government means that decisions affecting the poli-
ty will be made by accountable officials; anything else runs counter to the very 
defining principles of this nation”). 
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from this obligation, voters must be able to hold them account-
able for their specific policy choices. 
Not only has modern public law extended its focus to a per-
ceived need for specific political accountability, but contempo-
rary public law theory and doctrine typically presume that 
elected officials are politically accountable for their specific pol-
icy decisions because they are selected and potentially removed 
from office by the voters. For example, Alexander Bickel fa-
mously claimed that judicial review is “a deviant institution” in 
American democracy because it allows unelected judges to inva-
lidate the decisions of a popularly elected legislature.20 The 
countermajoritarian difficulty, which has been the central ob-
session in constitutional theory for decades, is premised on a 
belief that elected officials are politically accountable for their 
decisions, while members of the federal judiciary are not.21 Be-
cause discretionary policy decisions in a democracy should be 
made by representatives who are accountable to the electorate, 
the judiciary’s invalidation of congressional legislation (or ex-
ecutive action) on constitutional grounds appears anti-
democratic. Although constitutional scholars have devised 
countless theories that seek to explain why meaningful judicial 
review does not necessarily conflict with democracy,22 few 
commentators have even examined—much less challenged—
the underlying assumption that elected officials are politically 
accountable for their decisions and that their policy choices are 
rendered legitimate on this basis.23 
 
 20. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16–23 
(Yale Univ. Press 2d ed. 1986) (1962). 
 21. See Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 
577, 630 (1993) [hereinafter Friedman, Dialogue] (“The countermajoritarian 
difficulty posits that the ‘political’ branches are ‘legitimate’ because they fur-
ther majority will, while courts are illegitimate because they impede it.”); Bar-
ry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Coun-
termajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 155 (2002) 
[hereinafter Friedman, Academic Obsession] (“For decades, legal academics 
have struggled with the ‘countermajoritarian difficulty’: the problem of justify-
ing the exercise of judicial review by unelected and ostensibly unaccountable 
judges in what we otherwise deem to be a political democracy.”); Jane S. 
Schacter, Lawrence v. Texas and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Democratic As-
pirations, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 733, 762 (2004) (“The idea that 
legislators are accountable and courts are not lies at the very heart of the 
countermajoritarian difficulty.”). 
 22. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).  
 23. See Schacter, supra note 21, at 762 (“Despite the axiomatic character 
that Bickel and others seem to give this notion of accountability, constitutional 
scholars have barely scratched the surface in examining the quality and quan-
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Moreover, the assumption that elected officials are politi-
cally accountable for their decisions has been extended to other 
areas of modern public law theory with similar ramifications. 
Thus, the prevailing theory of legitimacy in administrative law 
is the “presidential control model,” which “seeks to ensure that 
administrative policy decisions reflect the preferences of the 
one person who speaks for the entire nation.”24 Because the 
President is the only nationally elected official in the American 
system of government, his decisions will presumably reflect the 
preferences of a majority of the electorate.25 If the President 
nonetheless strays from the will of the people, he (or at least 
his political party) can be held accountable at the next elec-
tion.26 Accordingly, the legislature’s delegation of policy-making 
authority to administrative agencies, which would otherwise be 
difficult to square with the American constitutional structure, 
can be legitimized if agency decisions are subject to the control 
of the Chief Executive who is politically accountable to all of 
the nation’s voters. 
The political accountability of the President has also pro-
vided a leading rationale for the judiciary’s deference to rea-
sonable interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions by 
administrative agencies. In Chevron, the Supreme Court ex-
plained that both agencies and courts are obligated to follow 
legislative intent when they implement a statute if Congress 
has expressly resolved the precise question at issue during the 
lawmaking process.27 If, however, Congress did not directly ad-
 
tity of political accountability that actually exists.”); supra note 13 and accom-
panying text. 
 24. Bressman, supra note 10, at 490.  
 25. See Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary 
Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 58–70 (1995) (arguing for “[a] unitary, national-
ly representative executive”); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2331–39 (2001) (describing how “presidential administra-
tion promotes accountability”); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The Pres-
ident and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 91–106 (1994) (discussing 
the historical development of “presidential authority” with respect to adminis-
tration agencies); Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators 
Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 95 (1985) (“[I]t may 
make sense to imagine the delegation of political authority to administrators 
as a device for improving the responsiveness of government to the desires of 
the electorate.”). But see Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist President 
and the Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1217 (2006) (challenging the 
claims and implications of this literature). 
 26. See Bressman, supra note 10, at 491.  
 27. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 842–43 (1984). 
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dress the precise question at issue, the judiciary should defer to 
a reasonable interpretation by the agency that was delegated 
authority to implement the program, rather than imposing its 
own construction on the statute.28 While the Court relied upon 
the presumptive intent of Congress and the expertise of agen-
cies, it also emphasized the superior political accountability of 
the President who exercises predominant control over the ad-
ministrative state: 
Judges are not experts in the field, and . . . must, in some cases, re-
concile competing political interests, but not on the basis of the 
judges’ personal policy preferences. In contrast, an agency to which 
Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within the 
limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent adminis-
tration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies 
are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is.  . . . 
[F]ederal judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to respect 
legitimate policy choices made by those who do. The responsibilities 
for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the 
struggle between competing views of the public interest are not judi-
cial ones: “Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political 
branches.”29 
The judiciary’s role in statutory interpretation is also 
strongly influenced by the assumption that elected officials are 
politically accountable for their decisions when Chevron defe-
rence is unavailable. The principle of legislative supremacy, 
whereby the judiciary is obligated to follow clearly expressed 
statutory mandates, is almost universally accepted in the 
American legal system.30 One reason for the principle’s popu-
larity stems from its compatibility with conventional under-
standings of the legislative and judicial functions, which in-
volve the enactment of generally applicable policies that are 
interpreted and applied in concrete cases or controversies.31 
The principle also draws much of its force, however, from the 
related notion that these institutional roles are mandated by a 
 
 28. See id. at 843–44. 
 29. Id. at 865–66. 
 30. See Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Le-
gitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 594 (1995) (“Our 
legal culture’s understanding of the link between statutory interpretation and 
democratic theory verges on the canonical and is embodied in the principle of 
‘legislative supremacy.’”); see also Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation 
and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 282 (1989) (defending a “weak” 
version of legislative supremacy that “precludes judicial policymaking only 
when a statutory directive is clear”(footnote omitted)). 
 31. See Farber, supra note 30, at 292–93 (“Because the supremacy prin-
cipal is fundamental to our institutional framework, violations of the principal 
defeat justified expectations and impair legal stability.”).  
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commitment to democracy because legislators—unlike judges—
are politically accountable to their constituents.32  
Contemporary public law scholars have generally con-
cluded that the principle of legislative supremacy should be 
understood to require courts to serve as the “faithful agents” of 
Congress.33 Moreover, the new textualists have claimed that a 
faithful agent of Congress is obligated to adhere to the plain 
meaning of statutory text based on the lessons of public choice 
theory and a proper understanding of the American constitu-
tional structure.34 The most devout proponents of this metho-
dology have even concluded that it is illegitimate for the federal 
judiciary to deviate from a clear statutory text to exercise 
equitable discretion or to avoid absurd results in particular 
cases.35 Among the purported goals of both the underlying me-
thodology and its more extreme implications are to limit the 
policy-making discretion of the unaccountable judiciary and 
enhance the political accountability of the legislature when it 
exercises policy-making authority.36 As is true of the other lead-
ing theories, the new textualism treats political accountability 
 
 32. See Schacter, supra note 30, at 594 (“Fidelity to the legislature is 
thought to satisfy the demands of democratic theory by allowing popularly 
elected officials, presumed to be accountable to their constituents, to make pol-
icy decisions.”). 
 33. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court 1983—Foreword: 
The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 60 (1984) (“Judges 
must be honest agents of the political branches. They carry out decisions they 
do not make.”); John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
2387, 2389 (2003) (“In a system marked by legislative supremacy (within con-
stitutional boundaries), federal courts act as faithful agents of Congress.”).  
 34. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15–22 (2001).  
 35. See Manning, supra note 33, at 2387–91; John C. Nagle, Textualism’s 
Exceptions, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, 2002, at 1, 2, http://www.bepress 
.com/ils/iss3/art15/ (“[W]hen the statutory text admits of no ambiguity, then 
the results of that interpretation—absurd or otherwise—become irrelevant to 
the textualist.”). 
 36. See Elizabeth Garrett, Legal Scholarship in the Age of Legislation, 34 
TULSA L.J. 679, 685 (1999) (“[M]ethods like textualism . . . are best understood 
as efforts to improve the quality of the decisionmaking in the politically ac-
countable branches.”); Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 23–29 (2006) (describing textualism’s efforts in “cabin-
ing judicial leeway”); Schacter, supra note 30, at 642 (explaining that Justice 
Scalia’s approach to statutory interpretation reflects “his persistent suspicion 
that legislators are chronically tempted to pass off difficult choices of policy to 
others and that such behavior sabotages the project of electoral accountabili-
ty”). 
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as the sine qua non of legitimate policy-making discretion in a 
democracy.37 
The dominance of the political accountability paradigm in 
contemporary public law theory has (perhaps ironically) contri-
buted to successful efforts to undermine representative democ-
racy in recent years. If voters must be able to choose and con-
trol their elected officials and some degree of “agency slack” is 
endemic to this relationship, democratic accountability would 
only be strengthened by allowing voters to make policy deci-
sions directly. Thus, the use of the ballot initiative process, 
which is routinely characterized as “lawmaking by the people,” 
has skyrocketed in recent years at the state and local levels 
partly as a result of widespread frustration with the traditional 
legislative process.38 Given the prevailing understanding of 
democratic accountability, it is not surprising that this form of 
lawmaking is frequently praised “as democracy in its purest 
form, as the closest we can come to genuine popular sovereign-
ty.”39 Indeed, if direct democracy is lawmaking by the people, 
successful ballot measures would arguably embody the consent 
of the governed and thereby achieve democratic legitimacy 
without the need for “accountability” that arises from the dele-
gation of lawmaking authority to an agent of the people.40 
An examination of the dominant schools of thought in the 
fields of constitutional theory, administrative law, and legisla-
tion reveals the establishment of a broader hierarchy of per-
 
 37. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion in Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2004) (claiming that “tenure” provides “a po-
werful reason not to allow judges to make policy” in a representative democra-
cy because “[w]hen judges make policy—which is, after all, what discretion in 
interpretation means—you can’t get rid of them”). 
 38. See Glen Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth of Popular Sovereignty and 
Applying an Agency Model to Direct Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REV. 395, 412–20 
(2003) (describing the typical perception of direct democracy and its increased 
use in recent years). 
 39. Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of “Popular Intent”: Interpretive Dilem-
mas in Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 151 (1995) (citing In re Estate of 
Thompson, 692 P.2d 807, 808 (Wash. 1984)). Although direct democracy has 
been criticized for other reasons, the ballot initiative process is typically consi-
dered above reproach on grounds of democratic accountability. See Bernard W. 
Bell, Marbury v. Madison and the Madisonian Vision, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
197, 233 (2003) (“The apotheosis of accountability is the plebiscite, and other 
forms of direct democracy.”). 
 40. See Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, 
100 COLUM. L. REV. 1454, 1477 (2000) (“Accountability, of course, would not be 
an issue in a direct democracy, in which every citizen participated directly in 
making laws.”). 
 1264 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:1253 
 
ceived institutional competence that corresponds with the per-
ceived political accountability of its actors. Thus, lawmaking by 
the people through the ballot initiative process is the “ideal” 
form of decision making in a democracy.41 Because this process 
is not always practical or available, public officials will still 
need to make countless important decisions.42 A broad consen-
sus has recently emerged that those decisions should preferably 
be made by a chief executive who is politically accountable to 
all of the nation’s voters.43 Although the executive branch may 
not contravene a constitutionally valid legislative mandate, 
statutes typically cannot be enacted without the executive’s as-
sent, and substantial enforcement discretion is preserved after 
a bill becomes a law.44 Moreover, there is widespread debate 
about the scope of the constitutional limits on Congress’s au-
thority to direct or constrain the activities of the executive 
branch and whether the President has independent authority 
to implement his understanding of the Constitution outside the 
courts.45 The dialogue on these subjects suggests that many, if 
not most, public law scholars would place the Chief Executive 
 
 41. See Clark, supra note 2, at 437 (“The populist case for direct democra-
cy is straightforward and appealing: direct democratic processes are at some 
level more democratic, more legitimate, than representative institutions, be-
cause they are more directly responsive to the people.”); Julian N. Eule, Judi-
cial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1513 (1990) (recognizing 
that if “[m]ajoritarian democracy . . . is the core of our constitutional system 
. . . the plebiscite certainly seems to have a strong claim to being its most trea-
sured instrument”). 
 42. Most significantly, the American Constitution prohibits direct democ-
racy at the federal level. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 43. See Cynthia Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple 
Rules for a Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 987–88 (1997) (recog-
nizing that courts and commentators have increasingly looked to the President 
“to supply the elusive essence of democratic legitimation” in the modern regu-
latory state because “[t]he President, and the President alone, represents the 
entire citizenry” and is therefore uniquely situated “to infuse into regulatory 
policymaking the will of the whole people”); supra notes 24–29 and accompa-
nying text (describing the perceived political accountability of the President). 
 44. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 831 (1985) 
(holding that non-enforcement decisions are presumptively immune from judi-
cial review under the APA).  
 45. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial 
Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1360–62 (1997) (de-
scribing the arguments in support of executive non-deference to Supreme 
Court constitutional interpretation, but arguing for the primacy of judicial in-
terpretation); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive 
Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 343–45 (1994) (concluding 
that the President should have the power to review the decisions of the judi-
cial and legislative branches).  
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one position above the legislature in this particular hierarchy. 
Administrative agencies, which were traditionally viewed as 
constitutionally suspect, have been legitimized (and, in effect, 
promoted to a position just below that of the legislature) in con-
temporary public law theory by the political accountability of 
the President who controls the modern administrative state.46 
In any event, the independent judiciary plainly sits at the bot-
tom of this institutional hierarchy and, indeed, modern public 
law can be understood as nothing more or less than an effort to 
ensure that the judiciary is appropriately deferential to these 
other politically accountable decision-makers. 
II.  THE IMPLAUSIBILITY OF THE POLITICAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY PARADIGM   
Modern public law typically presumes that elected officials 
are politically accountable to the voters for their specific policy 
decisions. President Bush and the Environmental Protection 
Agency would therefore presumably be accountable for the 
agency’s decision to transfer its permitting power to officials 
from Arizona under the National Pollution Discharge Elimina-
tion System without determining whether this course of action 
would jeopardize a protected species under the Endangered 
Species Act.47 Similarly, federal lawmakers would presumably 
be accountable for their decision to prohibit the knowing per-
formance of the intact dilation and evacuation procedure for 
terminating a pregnancy regardless of whether a medical pro-
fessional determined that this procedure was necessary for the 
preservation of the mother’s health.48 Federal lawmakers 
would also presumably be responsible for their apparent deci-
sion to require the Secretary of Education to calculate the per 
pupil expenditures of local school districts in a particular fa-
 
 46. See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text (discussing Chevron); 
see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000) 
(“[N]o matter how ‘important, conspicuous, and controversial’ the issue, and 
regardless of how likely the public is to hold the Executive Branch politically 
accountable, an administrative agency’s power to regulate in the public inter-
est must always be grounded in a valid grant of authority from Con-
gress.”(citation omitted)). 
 47. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 
2518, 2521–22 (2007) (5–4 decision) (reversing the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion 
that the transfer of power was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the 
APA).  
 48. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1632 (2007) (5–4 decision) 
(rejecting a facial challenge to the constitutional validity of the Partial Birth 
Abortion Act of 2003).  
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shion under the Impact Aid Program.49 Judicial decisions to in-
validate these actions or to deviate from the plain meaning of 
the governing legal texts would therefore illegitimately substi-
tute the court’s policy preferences for the apparent will of the 
people. 
For this form of political accountability to work, however, it 
would be necessary for the electorate (1) to know about the gov-
ernment’s decision; (2) to have an established preference about 
its desirability; (3) to be capable of identifying who was respon-
sible for the decision; and (4) to vote on the basis of this infor-
mation at the next election. One need not be a rocket scien-
tist—or even a political scientist—to realize that this set of 
conditions will only be satisfied in the most extraordinary of 
circumstances.50 In short, the presumption that elected officials 
are politically accountable for their specific policy decisions is 
wildly unrealistic. This ideal is therefore typically either a for-
mality or a fiction, but it is not meaningful enough, in reality, 
to carry the massive weight that is placed upon it by modern 
public law theory. This Part draws upon recent interdiscipli-
nary work in law and political science by Jane Schacter and 
others to explain why this is the case.  
A. THE ABSENCE OF “REAL” POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY  
FOR SPECIFIC POLICY CHOICES 
The fact that most citizens lack even basic political know-
ledge has been almost universally accepted by political scien-
tists for decades.51 For example, survey data has repeatedly 
 
 49. See Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dept. of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534, 
1536–37 (2007) (5–4 decision) (upholding the Secretary’s approach on the 
grounds that it reflected a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute). 
But see id. at 1551 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (claiming that the Secretary’s inter-
pretation was contrary to the plain meaning of the statute and the majority’s 
decision was “nothing other than the elevation of judge-supposed legislative 
intent over clear statutory text”).  
 50. I must confess that I am not the first “comedian” to use this specific 
joke. See Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congres-
sional Process, and the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 
YALE L.J. 1707, 1729 n.110 (2002). I have no serious ambitions, however, of 
being the last comic standing. 
 51. See ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DI-
LEMMA 17 (1998) (“The claim that citizens lack political information has a long 
and respected history.”); Schacter, supra note 4, at 47 (“It is an article of faith 
among political scientists that citizens are woefully uninformed about politics, 
and scholars have rarely resorted to understatement in characterizing the 
public’s knowledge gaps.”); Somin, supra note 4, at 1304 (“The most important 
point established in some five decades of political knowledge research is that 
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shown that many citizens are unaware of the identity of their 
elected representatives, which political parties are in control of 
major public institutions at any given time, and which public 
officials or institutions are responsible for various governmen-
tal functions.52 Many voters fail to understand basic ideological 
concepts, such as the meaning of “liberal” or “conservative.”53 
Perhaps most important for present purposes, most American 
citizens know “virtually nothing” about the specific policy is-
sues that are resolved by their elected representatives.54 Under 
these circumstances, it is implausible to believe that a signifi-
cant percentage of voters would be familiar with any more than 
a handful of the thousands of policy decisions that are made by 
the President, members of Congress, or administrative agencies 
during the course of an election cycle.55 
If citizens do not know about the existence of a policy issue, 
they will probably not have formed any meaningful preferences 
on its most desirable resolution. Moreover, political scientists 
who study public opinion have questioned whether the electo-
rate has preexisting or fixed preferences on many of the issues 
that are brought to its attention.56 For example, the results of 
public opinion polls frequently depend upon how questions are 
 
the majority of American citizens lack even basic political knowledge.”). For 
the leading work of political science on this subject, see MICHAEL X. DELLI 
CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT POLITICS AND 
WHY IT MATTERS (1996). 
 52. Somin, supra note 4, at 1304–06, 1316–17.  
 53. Id. at 1305–06.  
 54. See, e.g., John A. Ferejohn, Information and the Electoral Process, in 
INFORMATION AND DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES 3, 3 (John A. Ferejohn & James 
H. Kuklinski eds., 1990) (“Decades of behavioral research have shown that 
most people know little about their elected officeholders, less about their op-
ponents, and virtually nothing about the public issues that occupy officials 
from Washington to city hall.”).  
 55. See Schacter, supra note 4, at 47 (explaining that “[v]oters cannot hold 
legislators responsible without sufficient information about what legislators 
have, in fact, done” and that the necessary “information consistently eludes 
the electorate”); see also Jane S. Schacter, Accounting for Accountability in 
Dynamic Statutory Interpretation and Beyond, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, 
2002, at 1, 13, http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1024& 
context=ils (explaining an inability “to find any studies looking in any detail at 
the levels of citizen awareness of legislation written and passed by legislators” 
with the hypothesis that the public’s lack of “specific information about legis-
lation . . . seems too obvious to warrant study”).  
 56. See Schacter, supra note 4, at 59–63 (canvassing political science lite-
rature on how public policy is formed and identifying “problems with the abili-
ty of candidates . . . to reliably identify the content or strength of public atti-
tudes on key issues”). 
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posed because respondents often have no preexisting views on 
the underlying policy issues and essentially make up their an-
swers on the spot.57 Politicians and interest groups can there-
fore potentially construct or manufacture “public opinion” that 
supports their preexisting policy preferences or use favorable 
polling data from independent sources to move public opinion 
further in their favored direction.58 To the extent that majorita-
rian preferences cannot truly be identified and followed by con-
scientious elected officials, but rather are “crafted” by public of-
ficials and other elites for their own purposes, the majority’s 
will cannot serve as the autonomous constraint on—or focus 
for—decision making by elected officials that is contemplated 
by the political accountability paradigm.59 
Assuming that a substantial percentage of voters was 
aware of a particular governmental decision and had formed 
true preferences on the issue, the electorate would still need to 
be able to determine who was responsible for the decision to 
hold those officials politically accountable. This is not necessar-
ily an easy task for a sophisticated observer of a federal system 
of government with separated powers and a host of checks and 
balances.60 For example, an environmental activist who was 
upset about the inadequate protection of endangered species in 
Arizona could plausibly object to policy decisions by Congress, 
President Bush, EPA officials, Governor Napolitano, officials 
from the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality, and 
the United States Supreme Court.61 Moreover, the survey data 
shows that deficiencies in voter knowledge are particularly 
acute with respect to information that is relevant for assessing 
 
 57. JOHN R. ZALLER, THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MASS OPINION 76–80 
(1992).  
 58. See LAWRENCE R. JACOBS & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, POLITICIANS DON’T 
PANDER 112, 115, 119–20 (2000) (describing how the Clinton White House 
tried to influence public opinion about health care reform through analyzing 
polling data and other methods).  
 59. See Schacter, supra note 4, at 62–63 (describing recent political 
science literature that questions “the notion that the public has extant views 
that are tapped into by challengers or reporters who draw attention to incum-
bents’ votes,” and explaining that “public opinion may be a considerably more 
top-down affair, one in which politicians (among others) actively try to shape 
and sway public opinion”). 
 60. See id. at 47 (“[S]orting out who is responsible for particular public 
policies is formidably difficult in the context of a multimember legislature, 
multibranch government, and federal system.”).  
 61. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.  
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who is responsible for particular governmental decisions.62 Not 
only is the difficulty of accurately attributing blame for unpo-
pular governmental decisions a seemingly undisputed fact of 
modern political life (that is, of course, facilitated by some of 
the actions of public officials), but the need to improve the abili-
ty of citizens to make these determinations has been explicitly 
recognized by courts and commentators in a variety of different 
contexts.63 
Finally, the contemporary understanding of political ac-
countability presumes that voters have the capacity to sanction 
a deviant public official for an unpopular decision. This pre-
sumption is undermined on several different levels by the reali-
ties of modern elections. First, public officials are sometimes 
precluded by term limits from seeking reelection.64 Second, in-
cumbents are increasingly shielded from viable competition by 
the composition of their electoral districts.65 Third, there is an 
ongoing debate in the political science literature regarding 
whether voters use elections as opportunities to sanction in-
cumbents for their prior decisions, as opposed to selecting the 
best available representative for an upcoming term.66 Although 
voters probably take into account both types of considerations, 
it is certainly possible for incumbents who have made some 
very unpopular decisions to be reelected. In any event, even if 
voters based their decisions primarily on the past performance 
of their elected representatives, the combined effect of the large 
 
 62. See Somin, supra note 4, at 1315 (“[P]ast studies have repeatedly 
found that citizens have, at best, a very limited knowledge of how authority 
over issue areas is distributed in our complex political system.”). 
 63. These include federalism decisions by the Supreme Court, see Printz v. 
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 
144 (1992), as well as arguments in favor of reviving the nondelegation doc-
trine and adopting the theory of the unitary executive in constitutional law 
and strictly adhering to formal methods of statutory interpretation. For prom-
inent examples of each these respective arguments, see DAVID SCHOENBROD, 
POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY 99–106 (1993); Calabresi, supra note 25, at 
42–45; and Manning, supra note 33, at 2437.  
 64. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXII.  
 65. See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 593, 623–30 (2002) (describing the relation between increased 
gerrymandering and incumbent reelection rates); Richard H. Pildes, The Su-
preme Court, 2003 Term—Foreword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic 
Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 59–64 (2004) (explaining how gerrymandering 
has increasingly lowered the level of competition in political races). 
 66. See Schacter, supra note 6, at 758–59 (explaining that “the very idea 
of accountability uncritically assumes a retrospective focus” that implicates 
the debate in political science between the “selection or mandate view” and the 
“sanctions or accountability” view of voter behavior). 
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number of policy decisions that are made by every public offi-
cial and the limited number of candidates for a particular office 
means that an election will necessarily be an exceedingly blunt 
and ineffective instrument for the expression of voter prefe-
rences on specific policy issues.67 
In sum, it is clear that neither the Chief Executive, legisla-
tors, nor bureaucrats are politically accountable for their specif-
ic policy decisions in the manner that is contemplated by the 
prevailing paradigm in modern public law theory. First, the 
Executive Office of the President makes countless decisions 
that are invisible to the electorate, and even the relatively 
small number of decisions that receive some public attention 
are not necessarily salient to a majority of voters. Moreover, 
White House officials undoubtedly play a major role in a host of 
governmental decisions that are never attributed to the Presi-
dent. Even if a first-term President made numerous unpopular 
decisions that were transparent, American voters would still 
only be presented with one reasonably viable alternative. Final-
ly, the President is not eligible for reelection after his second 
term, and he makes far too many decisions, in any event, for 
electoral sanctions realistically to come into play on any regular 
basis. 
The bulk of Congress’s decisions receive even less public 
attention and arouse even less public interest than those of the 
President. Even when major actions by the entire body or a 
single chamber become salient to the general public, the voting 
decisions of individual members will routinely escape notice or 
be subject to conflicting interpretations. More generally, the 
collective nature of an ongoing, multimember institution that is 
subject to the requirements of bicameralism and presentment 
can make it difficult to ascertain who, if anyone, was responsi-
ble for any particular outcome. Although federal legislators are 
not subject to term limits, congressional elections are often less 
competitive than presidential races and even in closely con-
tested races, most of the specific policy decisions of an incum-
bent will play little if any role in the outcome. 
 
 67. For descriptions of this “bundling” problem, see Farina, supra note 43, 
at 998 (“[Bundling] precludes any facile translation of election results into ‘the 
people’s will’ on specific policy issues . . . .”); and Peter M. Shane, Political Ac-
countability in a System of Checks and Balances: The Case of Presidential Re-
view of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161, 197–200 (1994) (describing the li-
mited role of policy considerations in presidential elections).  
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Similarly, administrative agencies occasionally make high-
ly visible policy determinations, but the vast majority of regula-
tory decision making flies beneath the general public’s radar 
and implicates established preferences of the electorate only at 
very high levels of abstraction. Not only are most voters unlike-
ly to know or care about most administrative decisions, but 
they will routinely have difficulty accurately gauging responsi-
bility for those decisions that subsequently prove unpopular. 
While some of the highest profile agency decisions might occa-
sionally be attributed to the President, all of the limitations on 
his political accountability would exist in this context as well.68 
Accordingly, President Bush, for example, cannot be held polit-
ically accountable for the federal government’s inept response 
to Hurricane Katrina since it happened during his final term in 
office.  
B. THE LIMITS OF PARTIAL, PROXY, AND DIRECT POLITICAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
It seems indisputable that public officials are not really po-
litically accountable to the electorate for most of their specific 
policy decisions. This is particularly true of the vast majority of 
routine or technical policy determinations, such as whether to 
transfer the EPA’s permitting powers to state officials without 
assessing the impact on endangered species, or whether to al-
low the DOE to consider student population in calculating the 
 
 68. The administrative law literature on this topic tends to focus on the 
question of whether agency officials are “accountable” to their political prin-
cipals. The basic theory is that if elected representatives are accountable to 
voters, and agencies are, in turn, accountable to elected representatives, then 
agency decisions have democratic legitimacy on the grounds that they are suf-
ficiently responsive to the preferences of citizens. See, e.g., McNollgast, The 
Political Economy of Law: Decision-Making by Judicial, Legislative, Executive 
and Administrative Agencies, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1651, 
1663 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Stephen Shavel eds., 2007). My primary claim in 
this Article is that elected representatives are not politically accountable to 
the voters for their specific policy decisions. Accordingly, the “chain of accoun-
tability” that is envisioned by such theories of bureaucratic legitimacy is bro-
ken, and agency decisions cannot plausibly be connected to the will of the 
people on this basis. The extent to which agency decisions are controlled by 
elected officials is therefore beyond the scope of this Article. Nonetheless, to 
the extent that agency decisions are controlled by elected officials and elected 
officials are not politically accountable to the voters, the “logic of collective ac-
tion” would suggest that this form of political control will be affirmatively 
problematic in the absence of other mechanisms for holding public officials ac-
countable for their decisions. See. id. at 1714 (“If elected officials are a willing 
co-conspirator in agency capture, evidence that they influence policy will not 
assuage fears that the public interest is subverted.”).  
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per pupil expenditures of local school districts. The same con-
clusion would not necessarily hold, however, with respect to a 
small number of “momentous” or culturally significant deci-
sions—such as whether to prohibit “partial birth abortions” or 
regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles to 
limit the pace of global warming.69 It is therefore worthwhile to 
pause for a moment to consider the nature and degree of politi-
cal accountability for this much narrower category of policy 
choices. 
The primary difference between the routine and the mo-
mentous for purposes of political accountability appears to stem 
from the increased likelihood that voters will find out about a 
“momentous” policy decision and have—or at least develop—an 
established preference on the issue. There are, however, still 
reasons to doubt that elected officials are regularly held politi-
cally accountable even for their most visible policy choices. 
First, there may be ongoing difficulties associated with accu-
rately identifying who is responsible for a particular policy de-
cision. For example, the EPA argued that it lacked statutory 
authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new cars 
under the Clean Air Act, 70 which would presumably have 
shifted responsibility for the failure to counteract global warm-
ing from the executive branch to Congress. Moreover, the vot-
ing decisions of individual members of Congress on the Partial 
Birth Abortion Act of 2003 might not be known by, or accurate-
ly conveyed to, the general electorate, even if voters wanted to 
use this information as the basis for their reelection decision. 
One well-known study reported, for example, that less than 
twenty percent of survey respondents could identify a single 
vote by their representative in the House over the preceding 
two years.71 
Second, if voters accurately identified who was responsible 
for a momentous policy decision, those public officials might not 
face any political consequences. For starters, voters who fa-
vored a ban on “partial birth abortion” and efforts to combat 
global warming (and, say, strongly oppose the war in Iraq and 
same-sex marriage)—that is to say, an apparent majority of 
American citizens—may be facing difficult choices at the time 
 
 69. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2521–22 (2007); Massachu-
setts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1440–41 (2007). 
 70. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1450. 
 71. See George F. Bishop et al., What Must My Interest in Politics Be If I 
Just Told You “I Don’t Know”?, 48 PUB. OPINION Q. 210 (1984).  
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of an election. In any event, President Bush is not subject to 
electoral accountability for any of his second-term decisions. 
Legislators with safe seats are in essentially the same position, 
at least as long as they adhere to their party lines on issues of 
this nature.72 
The fact that there is a party line on issues of this nature 
may further limit the electoral consequences of an incumbent’s 
specific policy decisions because many of the voters who know 
and care about their resolution are inclined to vote for the par-
ty line as well. The net effect may be that (1) committed Repub-
licans oppose partial birth abortion and regulation of green-
house gases and vote in favor of Republican candidates; (2) 
committed Democrats proceed in precisely the opposite fashion; 
and (3) contested elections are decided by “the median voter.” 
Yet, the median voter is the median voter largely because she 
does not necessarily have fixed or consistent preferences on is-
sues of this nature. Accordingly, the median voter should be in-
terested to know that the failure to adopt an exception for the 
preservation of the mother’s health provided a constitutional 
and policy basis for opposing the Partial Birth Abortion Act of 
2003, even for representatives with stated objections to the pro-
cedure. Because a competitive election could, in theory, be in-
fluenced by whether this type of information was accurately 
conveyed to voters, candidates for office (and their allies) have 
powerful incentives to distort the voting records of their oppo-
nents. At the end of the day, it seems doubtful that median vot-
ers have sufficient information about momentous policy deci-
sions to adopt fully informed preferences on those issues—
much less that they make electoral decisions on that basis. Ra-
ther, because most policy issues are complex and election cam-
paigns are not conducive to reasoned (or even candid) delibera-
tion about their details, most voters base their election 
decisions on information shortcuts or cues that simplify the 
task of choosing the preferable candidate in light of all of the 
potentially relevant considerations. 
It is conceivable, perhaps, that these information shortcuts 
could compensate for the large gaps in the electorate’s political 
knowledge and thereby provide a form of “proxy accountabili-
ty.”73 Political scientists have recently claimed that voters can, 
 
 72. Cf. Schacter, supra note 4, at 66 (pointing out that primary elections 
may be “the more important elections in contemporary politics” in light of “the 
prevalence of safe seats in Congress”).  
 73. See id. at 50 (examining whether recent work in political science 
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in fact, make rational decisions based on limited information if 
they are exposed to simple cues that tell them, for example, 
what better informed individuals or groups think about the 
matter in a context that allows voters to assess the trustwor-
thiness of the speaker.74 The idea is that if voters can accurate-
ly decide which candidates they prefer based on party labels, 
endorsements, or other simple cues, elected officials could be 
held politically accountable in a manner that comports with 
modern public law theory.75 
The scholars who have examined this precise question 
have persuasively concluded that although information short-
cuts of this nature can be helpful, their potential availability 
does not establish that elected officials are politically accounta-
ble to the voters for their policy decisions. Many voters have in-
sufficient political knowledge to use information shortcuts ef-
fectively, and in the absence of the requisite background 
information, voting cues of this nature can be affirmatively 
misleading.76 The use of information shortcuts is also likely to 
entrench existing social inequalities and create substantial 
risks of voter manipulation because of the biased nature of 
many of the sources, the reductionist nature of persuasive polit-
ical argumentation, and systemic disparities in political know-
ledge that render some citizens more reliant on lower-quality 
information.77 Finally, the available voting cues are far too 
general and haphazard to enable voters to hold elected officials 
politically accountable for their policy decisions based on this 
information.78 For example, voters often rely upon the perfor-
mance of the national economy in presidential elections, and a 
 
might provide a basis for “proxy theories of accountability by identifying subs-
titutes for the kind of informational environment that might make actual ac-
countability possible”(emphasis omitted)).  
 74. See, e.g., LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 51, at 64 (explaining that 
concepts like reputation, party, or ideology are useful heuristics if they convey 
information about knowledge and trust). 
 75. See Schacter, supra note 4, at 51–52.  
 76. See Somin, supra note 4, at 1320–23; see also Schacter, supra note 4, 
at 64–65 (recognizing that “[v]arious scholars make the basic point that it is 
difficult for voters to use shortcuts well when they lack the necessary back-
ground knowledge to make sense of the shortcuts themselves,” and observing 
that “[t]herein lies the paradox: The voters arguably most in need of cues are 
also those least able to make good use of them”). 
 77. See Schacter, supra note 4, at 66–68.  
 78. See id. at 65–68.  
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heavily used voting cue in House elections is the name recogni-
tion of an incumbent who is running for reelection.79 
Similar fundamental problems also undermine the possi-
bility that political accountability could consistently be 
achieved by the need for politicians to predict how their consti-
tuents would react to a policy decision if it were brought to 
their attention.80 In this regard, political scientists have argued 
that the electorate’s lack of information about politics can be 
overcome by the fact that elected officials must anticipate the 
preferences of their constituents to avoid making decisions that 
could be used against them in future elections.81 If this is the 
case, then elected officials might be responsive to the will of the 
people even if the voters are generally unaware of it.82 As with 
the use of voting cues, this phenomenon does exist and it may 
help the electorate exercise some control over policy discretion 
without engaging in vigilant oversight of public officials, but re-
liance upon the “potential anticipated response of voters” will 
not hold politicians accountable for most of their specific policy 
decisions and may raise other serious problems as well. 
The bottom line, once again, is that it is completely unrea-
listic to believe that a politician’s need to predict how her con-
stituents would respond to a particular decision if it were 
brought to their attention makes elected officials politically ac-
countable for the bulk of their policy choices.83 Although it ap-
 
 79. See ZALLER, supra note 57, at 244–45 (discussing the importance of 
name recognition in House elections); Schacter, supra note 4, at 65 (explaining 
that the performance of the economy is a “venerable cue” in presidential elec-
tions even though experts have concluded that the President has an excee-
dingly modest ability to control short-term economic performance).  
 80. See Schacter, supra note 4, at 50 (describing the possibility of “accoun-
tability through prediction”).  
 81. See R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 3–
16, 82–87 (1990); MORRIS P. FIORINA, REPRESENTATIVES, ROLL CALLS, AND 
CONSTITUENCIES 43–63 (1974); V.O. KEY, JR., PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 496–99 (1961); JOHN W. KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN’S VOTING DE-
CISIONS 67–68 (3d ed. 1989); DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL 
CONNECTION 36–37 (1975) (“The ultimate concern . . . is not how probable it is 
that legislatures will lose their seats but whether there is a connection be-
tween what they do in office and their need to be reelected.”). 
 82. See Schacter, supra note 4, at 50 (“On this view, politicians’ steady 
contemplation of potential voter preferences might support a version of ac-
countability, even if voters themselves never assert or even perceive those pre-
ferences.”).  
 83. See id. at 54–63 (rejecting the possibility of achieving accountability 
through prediction based on the problems associated with implementing the 
theory and its propensities to accept existing inequalities and encourage ma-
nipulative behavior by elected officials and other elites). 
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pears at first glance that this phenomenon could at least pro-
vide political accountability for momentous decisions that are 
likely to reach the public agenda, this conclusion is called into 
question by the poor quality of political debate and the ability 
of politicians and interest groups to manufacture public opinion 
that corresponds with their own preferences.84 For example, the 
pro-life lobby and right wing of the Republican Party have ap-
parently succeeded in generating substantial public opposition 
to “partial-birth abortion.”85 It is far less clear, however, that a 
majority of voters favors a prohibition on this procedure in the 
absence of an exception for the preservation of the health of the 
mother.86 Yet, a member of Congress who only favored a ban on 
the knowing performance of the intact dilation and evacuation 
procedure for terminating a pregnancy with the aforemen-
tioned exception (consistent with the apparent preferences of a 
majority of voters) may have been forced into voting in favor of 
the Partial Birth Abortion Act of 2003 based on a legitimate 
fear that a contrary vote could be used against her at the next 
election. Similarly, the mounting public support for legislative 
action to counteract global warming that is being generated by 
environmental activists and the left wing of the Democratic 
Party could lead members of Congress to support severely 
flawed legislative proposals to avoid potential electoral retribu-
tion. Not only are political calculations of this nature therefore 
uncertain to result in action that truly comports with majorita-
rian preferences, but a realistic fear that voters will subse-
quently be misled about an incumbent’s voting record could 
even push decisions about important details of major policy is-
sues away from the preferences that would be held by a more 
fully informed electorate. The ultimate irony, then, is that far 
from promoting political accountability, the electorate’s reliance 
on information shortcuts and an incumbent’s need to consider 
how voters might respond to her decisions could actually com-
bine to undermine majoritarian preferences in certain situa-
tions. 
 
 84. See id. at 59–63; supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text.  
 85. See MORRIS P. FIORINA, CULTURE WAR? 55–56 & n.5 (2005) (reporting 
that “large majorities of Americans have consistently registered opposition to 
this particular procedure,” and suggesting that a focus on this procedure by 
pro-life groups may have been responsible for moving overall public opinion on 
abortion “a bit in a conservative direction in the late 1990s”). 
 86. See id. at 54–56 (reporting that “huge majorities” of Americans consis-
tently support legal access to abortions when “the woman’s health is seriously 
endangered”). 
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For similar reasons, the increased use of direct democracy 
to make discretionary policy choices would neither obviate the 
need for democratic accountability nor necessarily enhance the 
political accountability that exists in our democracy. Despite 
widespread rhetoric that direct democracy constitutes lawmak-
ing by “the people,” initiative proponents are the dominant 
force in successful ballot campaigns.87 Moreover, several fea-
tures of the ballot initiative process increase the risk that suc-
cessful ballot measures will have collateral consequences that 
were not anticipated or approved by the voters.88 Although 
some political scientists have been optimistic about the benefits 
of information shortcuts in the ballot initiative context,89 most 
voters can only use the available cues, at best, to cast a rational 
ballot on the broad objective of a proposal. This literature 
therefore does not support the conclusion that voters have suf-
ficient information to accurately express their preferences on 
the specific legal consequences of successful ballot measures. As 
is true in the context of candidate elections, the information 
shortcuts that are available in the ballot initiative context are 
simply too general to attribute many of the particular conse-
quences of this lawmaking process to the will of the people. At 
the same time, the initiative proponents who are in a position 
to understand and control these particular matters are not po-
litically accountable to anyone for their decisions. 
 
 87. See Staszewski, supra note 38, at 420–35 (describing the dominant 
role and substantial influence of initiative proponents); see also DAVID S. 
BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED 91–161 (2000) (describing the “initiative war 
in close-up”); Philip P. Frickey, Interpretation on the Borderline: Constitution, 
Canons, Direct Democracy, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 477, 519 (“Direct democra-
cy consists of two separate processes: proposal by well-organized interests and 
ratification by the electorate.”); Schacter, supra note 39, at 111 (“[T]he direct 
lawmaking process gives powerful leverage to initiative drafters, who are si-
tuated to construct a phantom popular intent through strategic drafting.”). 
 88. See Glen Staszewski, The Bait-and-Switch in Direct Democracy, 2006 
WIS. L. REV. 17, 32–39 (describing this problem).  
 89. See Arthur Lupia & John G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy: New Ap-
proaches to Old Questions, 7 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 463, 467–70 (2004) (reporting 
that recent studies have questioned the notion that the absence of detailed 
knowledge about the substance of ballot measures prevents the electorate 
from voting consistent with its preferences); see also SHAUN BOWLER & TODD 
DONOVAN, DEMANDING CHOICES 21–42 (1998); LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra 
note 51; Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Vot-
ing Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
63, 72 (1994) (“[T]he availability of certain types of information cues allows 
voters to use their limited resources efficiently while influencing electoral out-
comes in ways that they would have if they had taken the time and effort ne-
cessary to acquire encyclopedic information.”). 
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III.  THE DELIBERATIVE ACCOUNTABILITY PARADIGM   
The realization that elected officials are not really political-
ly accountable for their specific policy choices has far-reaching 
implications. For those who hinge democratic legitimacy on ma-
joritarian support for policy decisions, it calls the entire validity 
of the modern regulatory state into question. Only somewhat 
less dramatically, it highlights a potentially fatal flaw in mod-
ern public law theories, which accord heightened legitimacy to 
decisions by “politically accountable” institutions, regardless of 
the process by which they were enacted or their substantive 
merits. In short, the preceding Part demonstrates that the do-
minant paradigm in modern public law is implausible because 
public officials are not held politically accountable for their spe-
cific policy decisions pursuant to periodic elections. 
Because our instinctive desire for democratic accountabili-
ty is based on more fundamental commitments to ensuring the 
legitimacy of governmental authority and avoiding arbitrary 
decisions, we should consider the possibility of another para-
digm of democratic accountability that is based on different fea-
tures of republican government. This Part draws upon deliber-
ative democratic theory to develop this alternative paradigm by 
claiming that public officials in a democracy can be held ac-
countable by a requirement or expectation that they give rea-
soned explanations for their decisions. First, reason-giving 
promotes accountability by limiting the scope of available dis-
cretion and ensuring that public officials provide public-
regarding justifications for their decisions. Second, reason-
giving facilitates transparency, which, in turn, enables citizens 
and other public officials to evaluate, discuss, and criticize go-
vernmental action, as well as potentially to seek legal or politi-
cal reform. Most fundamentally, reason-giving fosters demo-
cratic legitimacy because it both embodies, and provides the 
preconditions for, a deliberative democracy that seeks to 
achieve consensus on ways of promoting the public good that 
take the views of political minorities into account. In the course 
of setting forth an alternative paradigm, this Part compares 
some of the central features of deliberative and political ac-
countability and responds to potential objections.  
 2009] REASON-GIVING AND ACCOUNTABILITY 1279 
 
A. THE VALUE OF REASON-GIVING 
The word “accountable” means that one is “required or ex-
pected to justify actions or decisions.”90 Although dictionary de-
finitions, standing alone, should certainly not always be dispo-
sitive,91 my contention is that public officials in a democracy 
can be held deliberatively accountable by a requirement or ex-
pectation that they give reasoned explanations for their deci-
sions. First, reason-giving promotes accountability by limiting 
the scope of available discretion. Because collective policy 
choices in a democracy cannot be justified solely on the basis of 
self-interest, public officials are expected to give public-
regarding justifications for their decisions.92 Although the need 
 
 90. WORDPERFECT 10 WORDPROCESSOR DICTIONARY. Although the source 
of this quotation shows that it was incredibly easy to find a definition of ac-
countability that comports with my view, more sophisticated examples are cer-
tainly available. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Confor-
mity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 
509–12 (2002) (explaining that psychological studies of “accountability” use 
the term to refer “to the implicit or explicit expectation that one may be called 
on to justify one’s beliefs, feelings, and actions to others,” and noting that al-
though the term “also usually implies that people who do not provide a satis-
factory justification for their actions will suffer negative consequences,” those 
consequences need not be material and may include contemptuous glances or 
even feelings of disappointment in one’s own performance) (quoting Jennifer S. 
Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Accountability, 125 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 255, 255 (1999)).  
 91. Cf. Glen Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, 81 IND. L.J. 1001 (2006) 
(providing a theoretical defense of the canon of statutory interpretation that 
authorizes the judiciary to deviate from the “plain meaning” of statutory lan-
guage to avoid “absurd results”).  
 92. See Jon Elster, Deliberation and Constitution Making, in DELIBERA-
TIVE DEMOCRACY 97, 104 (Jon Elster ed., 1998) (“Because there are powerful 
norms against naked appeals to interest or prejudice, speakers have to justify 
their proposals by the public interest.”). For influential ideals of this require-
ment, see GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 52–94 (describing a prin-
ciple of “reciprocity,” which requires citizens and officials to “appeal to reasons 
or principles that can be shared by fellow citizens who are similarly moti-
vated” when they “make moral claims in a deliberative democracy”); Joshua 
Cohen, Democracy and Liberty, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra, at 185, 
193–98 (describing a deliberative process in which participants regard one 
another as free, equal, and reasonable “in that they aim to defend and criticize 
institutions and programs in terms of considerations that others, as free and 
equal, have reason to accept, given the fact of reasonable pluralism and on the 
assumption that those others are themselves concerned to provide suitable 
justifications” (emphasis omitted)); John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Re-
visited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765, 773 (1997) (“A citizen engages in public reason 
. . . when he or she deliberates within a framework of what he or she sincerely 
regards as the most reasonable political conception of justice, a conception that 
expresses political values that others, as free and equal citizens might also 
reasonably be expected reasonably to endorse.”). 
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to explain why a particular policy choice would promote the 
public good may not pose a substantial constraint in many cas-
es, a reasoned decision-making requirement helps to eliminate 
official self-dealing and “naked preferences” for one individual 
or group over another.93 Perhaps more important, an expecta-
tion that public officials will provide public-regarding justifica-
tions for their decisions changes the nature of legitimate deli-
beration in the policy-making process.94 It is not enough for a 
decision maker to follow her own or her constituents’ pre-
political preferences, but she must instead be capable of ex-
plaining why a particular course of action is best for the com-
munity as a whole.95 Because public officials must provide pub-
lic-regarding justifications for their decisions, other 
participants in the process have incentives to articulate their 
claims in public-regarding terms as well. As a result, relatively 
selfish policy options may be discarded in favor of more public-
spirited alternatives at the outset of the policy-making 
process,96 and subsequent deliberations conducted pursuant to 
this principle can expose additional common ground.97 
 
 93. See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 CO-
LUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984) (“If naked preferences are forbidden . . . and the gov-
ernment is forced to invoke some public value to justify its conduct, govern-
ment behavior becomes constrained.”). 
 94. See Elster, supra note 92, at 100 (“The mere fact that an assembly of 
individuals defines its task as that of deliberation rather than mere force-
based bargaining exercises a powerful influence on the proposals and argu-
ments that can be made.”).  
 95. This is an essential component of civic republican theory. See Mark 
Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1531–32 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican 
Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1547–51 (1988) [hereinafter Sunstein, Republican 
Revival]; Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. 
L. REV. 29, 31–32 (1985) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interest Groups]. 
 96. See Elster, supra note 92, at 104 (claiming that the obligation to pro-
vide a public-regarding justification creates an incentive for speakers to modi-
fy their positions in a less selfish direction because “a perfect coincidence be-
tween private interest or prejudice and impartial argument is suspicious”).  
 97. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 43 (“Through the give 
and take of argument, citizens and their accountable representatives can learn 
from one another, come to recognize their individual and collective mistakes, 
and develop new views and policies that are more widely justifiable.”); James 
D. Fearon, Deliberation as Discussion, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra 
note 92, at 44, 52 (“[O]ne reason a group might want to discuss something ra-
ther than simply voting on it is to lessen the effects of bounded rationality, 
and discussion may serve this purpose, even when there are known conflicting 
interests in the group.”); Bernard Manin, On Legitimacy and Political Delibe-
ration, 15 POL. THEORY 338, 350 (Elly Stein & Jane Mansbridge trans., 1987) 
(“[D]uring political deliberation, individuals acquire new perspectives not only 
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The practice of reason-giving further limits the scope of 
available discretion over time by encouraging public officials to 
treat similarly situated persons alike and to treat differently 
situated persons differently. Frederick Schauer has pointed out 
that when individuals give reasoned explanations for their de-
cisions, they routinely invoke relatively general principles to 
justify their chosen courses of action.98 By making a public 
commitment to respect those general principles, public officials 
can be expected to follow them to their logical conclusion when-
ever they are shown to be applicable.99 If public officials subse-
quently deviate from the apparent import of their previously 
articulated principles, they can be expected to provide a rea-
soned explanation for why the situation at hand is distinguish-
able. Reason-giving therefore has the capacity to promote the 
equal treatment of regulated parties, and to achieve greater 
overall coherence in the law. Thus, reason-giving allows for the 
establishment and operation of a system of common-law-style 
precedent that public officials can be expected to follow or re-
fine when subsequent controversies arise. 
Second, reason-giving promotes accountability by facilitat-
ing transparency in government. If citizens are unaware that a 
particular governmental official has made a specific policy deci-
sion, they cannot possibly hold that official accountable in any 
meaningful way for this action. A requirement or expectation 
that the public official will provide a reasoned explanation for 
the decision enables interested citizens and other public offi-
cials to evaluate, discuss, and criticize the action, as well as po-
tentially to seek political or legal reform. For this process to 
work, the reasons that governmental officials provide for their 
decisions must ordinarily be publicly available.100 Moreover, 
 
with respect to possible solutions, but also with respect to their own prefe-
rences”); Robert B. Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An 
Interpretive Essay, 94 YALE L.J. 1617, 1635–37 (1985) (explaining that 
“[d]uring the course of deliberation, people may discover both new information 
and new perspectives about what is at stake in the decision before them,” 
which may lead them both “to modify their choice of means for achieving their 
ends” and “perhaps to reconsider those ends”). 
 98. See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 641 
(1995). 
 99. See id. at 649 (“[G]iving a reason creates a prima facie commitment on 
the part of the reason giver to decide subsequent cases in accordance with that 
reason.”).  
 100. For an extensive discussion of “the value of publicity” in deliberative 
democracy, as well as some potentially legitimate exceptions to this general 
principle, see GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 95–127. For a recent 
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when an official’s explanation for her decision is based on em-
pirical claims, they should be based upon reliable methods of 
inquiry and consistent with available information.101 Although 
a patently false explanation could eventually be disproved, the 
whole point of a reasoned explanation is to justify a decision on 
the merits to someone who may not share the official’s over-
arching point of view.102 It would therefore be illegitimate to 
trick other public officials or citizens into accepting a policy de-
cision based upon false information. At the same time, a re-
quirement or expectation that policy choices will be publicly 
justified in a manner that is consistent with reliable methods of 
inquiry and available empirical information encourages the use 
of technical expertise in the modern regulatory state. 
In addition to providing instrumental benefits by con-
straining official discretion and promoting transparency in gov-
ernment, an obligation to provide reasons for policy decisions 
that could reasonably be accepted by free and equal citizens 
with competing perspectives performs the more fundamental 
function of promoting the legitimacy of government authority 
in a democracy.103 Consent-based theories of legitimacy are no-
toriously problematic in the absence of unanimity, apart from 
the difficulties associated with implementing the will of the 
people that were explored above.104 Moreover, contrary to the 
usual assumption, people do not typically enter into the politi-
cal process with fully formed preferences on specific policy is-
sues. Rather, they routinely have a host of beliefs, values, and 
interests that are not fully consistent with one another. Deli-
berative democratic theorists have therefore emphasized that 
reasoned deliberation helps decision-makers to ascertain their 
own policy preferences by providing them with useful informa-
tion and competing perspectives about the ideal resolution of a 
problem.105 Because this discussion can simultaneously build a 
broad consensus around a particular solution, the process of 
 
discussion of the potential drawbacks of public deliberation, see ADRIAN VER-
MEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY 195 (2007).  
 101. See GUTTMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 15, 56.  
 102. See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text.  
 103. See, e.g., Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in 
THE GOOD POLITY, 17, 21 (Alan Hamlin & Philip Pettit eds., 1989); Manin, su-
pra note 97, at 340, 388; see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITU-
TION 17 (1993) (“In American constitutional law, government must always 
have a reason for what it does.”).  
 104. See Manin, supra note 97, at 341–44.  
 105. See id. at 349–50.  
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reasoned deliberation helps to legitimize specific policy choices 
from the standpoint of the prevailing majority. From this pers-
pective, it is doubtful that public officials could make legitimate 
policy choices without developing good reasons for taking par-
ticular courses of action over the available alternatives. 
Deliberative democratic decisions are also legitimate from 
the standpoint of the minority. Although everyone might theo-
retically consent to a majority voting procedure because it 
treats everyone equally and offers opportunities for various 
groups to prevail on different issues, the validity of this consent 
would be significantly enhanced if the interests and perspec-
tives of the minority were taken into account in reaching a de-
cision.106 Indeed, deliberative democratic theorists have gone 
one step further and claimed that public policies adopted by a 
majority can only be legitimate if the minority’s interests and 
perspectives were adequately considered during the decision-
making process and the prevailing outcome is one that “could 
be the object of a free and reasoned agreement among 
equals.”107 
Reason-giving can therefore be understood as the enforce-
ment mechanism that holds public officials accountable for 
making legitimate policy choices in a deliberative democracy. A 
requirement or expectation that public officials will give rea-
soned explanations for their policy decisions that could reason-
ably be accepted by free and equal citizens with competing 
perspectives helps to ensure that the government makes valid 
choices based on the best available information and that the in-
terests and perspectives of minorities are adequately consi-
dered. Some prominent legal scholars have, in fact, recently ar-
gued from this basic perspective that reason-giving is 
fundamental to the political and moral legitimacy of a democ-
racy and that elected representatives have a constitutionally 
mandated obligation to provide reasons for their policy deci-
sions.108 Regardless of whether it is constitutionally required, 
 
 106. See generally Rebecca L. Brown, The Logic of Majority Rule, 9 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 23 (2006).  
 107. Cohen, supra note 103, at 22; see also Manin, supra note 97, at 359–60 
(explaining that the principle of majority rule is only justified if “[t]he decision 
results from a [deliberative] process in which the minority point of view was 
also taken into consideration”).  
 108. For these respective arguments, see Jerry L. Mashaw, Reasoned Ad-
ministration: The European Union, the United States, and the Project of Demo-
cratic Governance, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, 116 (2007); Brown, supra note 
106, at 41. 
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reason-giving can certainly be understood as a viable alterna-
tive to elections for purposes of holding public officials demo-
cratically accountable for their specific policy choices.109 
B. DISTINGUISHING DELIBERATIVE AND POLITICAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
The deliberative accountability that is fostered by reason-
giving differs in some fundamental ways from the political ac-
countability that is currently envisioned by modern public law 
theory. First, rather than limiting the time frame during which 
public officials can be called to account to the holding of period-
ic elections, deliberative accountability is a far more dynamic 
phenomenon that frequently begins when a policy question is 
first being considered, it reaches a crescendo when responsible 
public officials make a significant decision, and it potentially 
continues indefinitely while the opponents of the existing sta-
tus quo press for legal or political change in a variety of institu-
tional settings.110 The American public law system allows 
elected officials to enact statutes, which are typically imple-
mented by administrative agencies, reviewed by courts, and po-
tentially modified by subsequent legislative action.111 Because 
policy making in this system is fluid, provisional, and dialogic, 
we need a theory of accountability that can potentially keep 
pace with the realities of the process. Unlike political accounta-
bility, deliberative accountability can meet this challenge be-
cause it recognizes that public officials (and others) should give 
reasoned explanations for their decisions at each stage of the 
policy-making process.112 
Second, rather than focusing almost exclusively on the 
agency relationship between elected officials and their voting 
 
 109. Cf. Mashaw, supra note 108, at 124 (recognizing that “[t]he alterna-
tive to will-based democratic theories are theories based on some vision of pub-
lic reason,” and claiming that “administration without reason cannot meet the 
challenge of defending its democratic legitimacy”).  
 110. Cf. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 142–43 (describing “the 
reiteration of deliberation” and explaining that “[i]nstead of the arbitrary mo-
ments of accountability that elections offer, deliberative democracy provides 
an ongoing process” that “continues through stages, as officials present their 
proposals, citizens respond, officials revise, citizens react, and the stages re-
cur”). 
 111. See infra notes 185–88 and accompanying text (describing the Ameri-
can public law system).  
 112. See infra notes 183–89 and accompanying text (endorsing a frame-
work of separated powers that envisions “a checking and balancing circle of 
deliberative circles”). 
 2009] REASON-GIVING AND ACCOUNTABILITY 1285 
 
constituents, deliberative accountability provides a more com-
prehensive way of accommodating the full array of relations 
that are implicated by policy-making decisions. For starters, an 
authoritative decision maker has a responsibility to herself to 
reach a decision that she finds acceptable in light of her know-
ledge of the relevant facts and circumstances.113 Social scien-
tists and philosophers have recognized that reason-giving is an 
innate characteristic of human beings that is associated with 
our ability to rationally evaluate and justify our actions.114 
From this perspective, we do not necessarily need to give rea-
sons to anyone for reason-giving to carry intrinsic meaning. On 
the other hand, elected officials in a democracy do have special 
obligations to their constituents and other public officials to 
consider their interests and perspectives and to provide rea-
soned explanations for policy choices that take these considera-
tions into account.115 At the same time, deliberative accounta-
bility is not limited to an obligation by elected officials to 
consider (much less mechanically follow) the preferences of 
their voting constituents on each particular issue.116 Rather, 
public officials in a deliberative democracy also have an obliga-
tion to consider the interests and perspectives of everyone who 
will be bound by a decision,117 as well as other persons who 
could subsequently be affected, including noncitizens and 
people who have yet to be born.118 Deliberative accountability is 
therefore capable of transcending electoral boundaries and en-
couraging public officials to reach the best possible decisions on 
 
 113. See John Gardner, The Mark of Responsibility (with a Postscript on 
Accountability), in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 11, at 220, 220–43.  
 114. See CHARLES TILLY, WHY? 8 (2006) (“While, by some definitions, other 
primates employ language, tools, and even culture, only humans start offering 
and demanding reasons while young, then continue through life looking for 
reasons why.”); Gardner, supra note 113, at 221 (“As rational beings we cannot 
but aim at excellence in rationality.”).  
 115. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 128–29 (“Representa-
tives are first of all accountable to voters, and to others with whom they have 
some special relationship (such as supporters of their party).”). 
 116. Cf. Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 95, at 41–43 (describing 
Madison’s vision of representation). 
 117. See supra notes 106–07 and accompanying text.  
 118. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 144–64 (discussing “the 
problem of constituency” in a deliberative democracy and claiming that the 
principle of accountability requires that “representatives justify their actions 
from a moral point of view, which implies that they owe an account not only to 
their electoral constituents but also to what we may call their moral constitu-
ents—citizens in other states and other nations, groups of disadvantaged citi-
zens, and citizens yet to be born”).  
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the merits in light of the entire range of competing perspectives 
and affected interests. 
Third, while political accountability rests upon the power 
of segments of the electorate to sanction deviant public officials, 
deliberative accountability is premised on the need for public 
officials and citizens to persuade one another of the merits of 
their positions. Instead of privileging political power, delibera-
tive accountability emphasizes the obligation of public officials 
and citizens to engage with one another on the substance of pol-
icy issues with an attitude of mutual respect.119 Reason-giving 
initially fosters self-respect by allowing public officials to do 
what they believe is appropriate under the circumstances based 
upon the best available information. Because participants in 
the policy-making process can be expected to give reasons for 
their positions that could be accepted by free and equal persons 
with fundamentally competing perspectives, however, delibera-
tive accountability simultaneously encourages public officials 
(and others) to respect alternative views and interests and be 
open to revising their initial preferences based on additional in-
formation.120 Thus, a requirement or expectation that public of-
ficials will provide a reasoned explanation for their decisions 
should be understood as a defining feature of republican de-
mocracy,121 at least as important as periodic elections, because 
it forces public officials to treat citizens who are bound by their 
decisions with the proper degree of respect. While it may be ap-
propriate for a parent to respond to a child’s request for an ex-
planation with the witty repartee, “because I said so,” or, more 
authoritatively, “because I’m your [parent] and I said so,” this 
merely demonstrates that families are not necessarily demo-
cracies. In a true democracy, citizens are ordinarily entitled to 
a more meaningful explanation for the official exercise of coer-
cive authority. 
 
 119. See Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 95, at 1549–50 (“The an-
tonym of deliberation is the imposition of outcomes by self-interested and po-
litically powerful private groups.”). On the respect that is fostered by reasoned 
deliberation, see GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 18 (“When citizens 
deliberate in democratic politics, they express and respect their status as polit-
ical equals even as they continue to disagree about important matters of pub-
lic policy.”); Cohen, supra note 92, at 186 (explaining that in the deliberative 
conception of democracy, “citizens treat one another as equals . . . by offering 
them justifications for the exercise of collective power framed in terms of con-
siderations that can, roughly speaking, be acknowledged by all as reasons”). 
 120. See, e.g., Manin, supra note 97, at 349–64 (explaining how delibera-
tion can shape individual preferences and achieve collective legitimacy). 
 121. See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text.  
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Finally, rather than viewing any policy outcome that is 
presumptively supported by a majority of voters as legitimate, 
deliberative accountability maintains that the legitimacy of a 
policy decision is a function of both its procedural and substan-
tive validity.122 Thus, as explained above, public officials should 
ordinarily be expected to give reasoned explanations for their 
decisions that are publicly available. Moreover, the reasons 
provided should be public-regarding and potentially acceptable 
to free and equal persons with fundamentally competing pers-
pectives, as well as consistent with the best available empirical 
evidence. Public officials and other citizens should therefore be 
willing, and even expected, to consider changing their positions 
in light of new information or arguments. At the same time, 
policy makers should follow their previously articulated prin-
ciples on an even-handed and consistent basis and be capable of 
providing reasoned explanations for alleged deviations from 
prior courses of action. 
C. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS 
Critics of deliberative democracy who have absorbed the 
lessons of legal realism and been conditioned to understand law 
and politics in a pluralistic fashion routinely dismiss the quest 
for deliberative consensus or agreement on the grounds that an 
objective public interest does not exist. This criticism, which is 
most likely a holdover from the elitist political thinking of Ed-
mund Burke,123 reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of 
contemporary theories of deliberative democracy that seek to 
facilitate deliberative consensus or agreement in the face of in-
tractable moral disagreement.124 The idea is not that reasoned 
 
 122. See, e.g., GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 27; Cohen, supra 
note 92, at 187. 
 123. See Roberto Gargarella, Full Representation, Deliberation, and Impar-
tiality, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 92, at 260, 263–64 (describ-
ing “Burke’s model” of deliberative democracy and explaining that there is 
“plain textual evidence . . . of the confidence he had in deliberation as a means 
for achieving ‘correct’ political decisions”). 
 124. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 1 (explaining that the 
core idea of deliberative democracy is that “when citizens and their represent-
atives disagree morally, they should continue to reason together to reach mu-
tually acceptable decisions”); Cohen, supra note 92, at 187–93 (describing his 
assumption of “the fact of reasonable pluralism: the fact that there are dis-
tinct, incompatible philosophies of life to which reasonable people are drawn 
under favorable conditions for the exercise of practical reason”); Rawls, supra 
note 92, at 765–66 (“[A] basic feature of democracy is the fact of reasonable 
pluralism—the fact that a plurality of conflicting reasonable comprehensive 
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deliberation will eliminate fundamental moral disagreement or 
lead to the discovery of uniquely correct answers to controver-
sial policy questions, but rather that it will compel participants 
in the policy-making process to respect fundamentally diver-
gent perspectives, while simultaneously improving the quality 
of the particular policy decisions that are rendered through the 
pooling of both information and ideas, and the utilization of 
substantive expertise.125 Although a substantial degree of rea-
sonable disagreement will undoubtedly remain, the process of 
reasoned deliberation should facilitate tentative resolutions to 
specific policy questions that are more widely acceptable to a 
broader range of interests, partly as a function of eliminating 
certain objectionable types of reasons for action from considera-
tion in the public arena.126 In short, the underlying hope is that 
if we take unduly partial reasons for acting off the table, pro-
vide decision-makers with the best available empirical informa-
tion, and encourage them to resolve the problem through deli-
berations that are conducted in a spirit of mutual respect and 
cooperation, the final policy decision is likely to be the most le-
gitimate and meritorious option under the circumstances. 
One could, of course, still raise several potential objections 
to the claim that public officials in a democracy can be held ac-
countable by a requirement that they give reasoned explana-
tions for their decisions. First, it is possible that public officials 
and other citizens will provide insincere reasons for their policy 
decisions.127 While motivated primarily by their own selfish in-
terests or those of powerful constituents, participants in the 
policy-making process could still satisfy the demands of deli-
berative accountability by providing certain public-regarding 
justifications for their positions. The concern is not only that 
rent-seeking policy choices would thereby be accorded false le-
gitimacy, but that a requirement or expectation that public offi-
cials provide reasoned explanations for their decisions creates 
an affirmative incentive for such duplicity. From this perspec-
 
doctrines, religious, philosophical, and moral, is the normal result of its cul-
ture of free institutions.”).  
 125. See Fearon, supra note 97, at 44–68 (cataloguing potential benefits of 
reasoned deliberation); supra notes 119–22 and accompanying text.  
 126. See supra notes 92–97 and accompanying text.  
 127. See, e.g., Fearon, supra note 97, at 47 (“The principal dilemma for dis-
cussion as a means of revealing private information relevant to a political 
choice is that people can have strategic incentives to misrepresent their prefe-
rences or special knowledge.”).  
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tive, voters should be encouraged to judge public officials not by 
what they say, but rather by what they do. 
While there is little doubt that public officials and other 
citizens sometimes give insincere reasons for their policy deci-
sions, this situation does not severely undermine the signific-
ance of deliberative accountability.128 First, the prospect of 
judging public officials solely by what they do falsely assumes 
that the prevailing paradigm of political accountability is ac-
tually effective.129 Second, the fact that a public official pro-
vided a reasoned explanation for a decision hardly forecloses 
one’s ability to remain unpersuaded or to challenge any accom-
panying legal or political action. Rather, the existence of deli-
berative accountability enables citizens to contest both what 
public officials have said and what they have done. Although 
the provision of a reasoned explanation bolsters the legitimacy 
of governmental action, it need not necessarily increase its 
popularity or the extent to which there is societal agreement on 
the matter.130 In addition to the benefits described above, deli-
berative accountability is premised on a conviction that it is 
more productive to debate the merits of particular policy choic-
es, rather than trying to ascertain or impugn the motives of 
those who have taken a position.131 It would admittedly be pre-
ferable if public officials and citizens regularly provided ge-
nuine reasons for their positions, but insincerity does not elim-
inate our ability to evaluate the merits of their choices or the 
explanations that they have provided to justify them. On the 
contrary, insincere explanations are more likely to be vulnera-
ble to criticism.132 
 
 128. The notion of deliberative accountability that is set forth here differs 
in this respect from some prominent theories of deliberative democracy. See 
John M. Kang, The Irrelevance of Sincerity: Deliberative Democracy in the Su-
preme Court, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 305, 306 (2004) (identifying several promi-
nent theorists of deliberative democracy who have advocated sincerity in pub-
lic discourse). For a similar perspective to my own, see Elster, supra note 92, 
at 100–05 (“[A] deliberative setting can shape outcomes independently of the 
motives of the participants.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 129. See supra Part II (describing the weaknesses of political accountabili-
ty). 
 130. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 73–91 (discussing legi-
timate ways of dealing with “deliberative disagreement”). 
 131. See id. at 171 (“Utilitarians rightly remind us that attacks on motive 
and character distract citizens from the substance of issues.”).  
 132. The use of “strict scrutiny” in constitutional law has been justified 
partly on the same underlying basis. See, e.g., Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory 
and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal 
Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 802 (2006). 
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A second potential objection to reason-giving as a form of 
accountability stems from the possibility that the implementa-
tion of deliberative democracy could reinforce existing societal 
inequalities based on its relatively exclusive nature.133 Because 
only a small percentage of public officials and engaged citizens 
or interest groups will personally deliberate about politics or 
even become aware of the reasoning that is provided by author-
itative decision-makers or other activists, the interests and 
perspectives of the inattentive public could potentially be sys-
tematically ignored. This concern is heightened by the fact that 
actual political knowledge and participation is distributed une-
qually in our society, and media coverage and other sources of 
political information are similarly skewed in favor of the well-
organized and socially advantaged.134 In other words, the con-
cern is that deliberative accountability is inherently elitist in 
nature and that excessive reliance upon it could therefore ei-
ther be detrimental to socially marginalized individuals and 
groups or unsympathetic to the majority’s preferences. 
Although simultaneously avoiding both majority and mi-
nority faction is undoubtedly tricky, reliance upon reasoned de-
liberation is apt to fare better than political accountability in 
this regard. The prevailing paradigm of political accountability 
is premised upon a pluralist understanding of politics in which 
the role of public officials is merely to aggregate and implement 
the preferences of their constituents. If this system worked 
properly, the interests of discrete and insular minorities would 
systematically be ignored, at least in the absence of some coun-
termajoritarian corrective.135 To the extent that the members of 
such groups lack political knowledge and fail to participate in 
the process, this problem is severely exacerbated. It is therefore 
fairly obvious to see how unmediated popular decision making 
could lead to the tyranny of the majority. Conversely, if a ma-
 
 133. See, e.g., Gargarella, supra note 123, at 269–74 (identifying the diffi-
culties associated with achieving “full representation” in contemporary socie-
ties, and concluding that proposals for improving “the impartiality of the deci-
sion-making process just by improving its deliberative character” are 
implausible “if most people are kept at the margins of political deliberation”). 
 134. See Eule, supra note 41, at 1514–15 (“Citizens of higher social and 
economic status are far more heavily represented among [American] voters 
than among those who abstain, a class skew virtually unparalleled in any oth-
er political system conducting free elections.”); Somin, supra note 4, at 1354–
64 (describing “large intergroup differences in political knowledge . . . in the 
United States today”).  
 135. For a classic defense of judicial review that is based on the need to 
reinforce the representation of these interests, see ELY, supra note 22.  
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jority of citizens lack political knowledge and fail to participate 
effectively, the pluralist political process could be captured by 
narrow special interests with disproportionate influence over 
public officials.136 Because political participation and know-
ledge is distributed unequally in our society, an unregulated 
pluralist political process is, in fact, likely to lead to majorita-
rian tyranny on some issues and special interest domination of 
others—the worst of both worlds from an institutional design 
perspective. 
Discrete and insular minorities and unorganized general 
interests are both better situated to prevail in a system that 
values reason-giving because deliberative accountability privi-
leges persuasive ideas over political power.137 A political system 
of this nature treats each distinct interest and perspective with 
equal respect by taking them fully into account in formulating 
a decision. Because the prevailing policy choices should be 
based on the best available options under the circumstances, 
the specific sources of competing proposals and their respective 
popularity should not ordinarily be determinative. This does 
not mean, however, that such considerations are completely ir-
relevant. For example, public officials should give due regard to 
the input of anyone with relevant expertise.138 Moreover, it 
may be appropriate for public officials to consider the intensity 
of preferences and provide extra weight to the interests of those 
who will be most greatly affected by a particular decision.139 
 
 136. This is one of the central lessons of public choice theory. See MANCUR 
OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971).  
 137. See, e.g., GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 132–34 (“To the ex-
tent that the political struggle takes place on the basis of deliberation rather 
than of power, it is more evenly matched.”); see also Cohen, supra note 103, at 
21–22 (claiming that political power can be justified “if and only if [a decision] 
could be the object of a free and reasoned agreement among equals”); Christo-
pher H. Schroeder, Deliberative Democracy’s Attempt to Turn Politics into 
Law, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 95, 100–01 (2002) (explaining that under 
deliberative democratic theory, “[u]ses of political power should be choice-
sensitive and status insensitive”).  
 138. See Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, When Does Delibe-
rating Improve Decisionmaking?, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 9, 35–39 
(2006) (advocating “expertise systems” as “an effective way to improve social 
welfare” and claiming that even though such systems “are not consistent with 
many views of deliberation, where equality among participants is a key fea-
ture . . . many scholars who advocate deliberation actually recommend some 
form of an expertise system”).  
 139. See Fearon, supra note 97, at 45–46 (explaining that discussion “al-
lows people to express diverse intensities of preferences” and that the “rela-
tively nuanced revelation of private information” that is facilitated by delibe-
ration may influence voting decisions).  
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The apparent preferences of a majority might otherwise play a 
tie-breaking function in the absence of any need for structural 
safeguards to protect minority interests.140 The crux of the mat-
ter is that unlike in a pluralist system, the inattentive public 
does not need to be equally represented in either numbers or 
power in order to protect their interests in a deliberative de-
mocracy, as long as their voices can be heard and they have 
something significant to say. 
This does not mean that existing inequalities in political 
knowledge and participation are entirely unproblematic. On 
the contrary, the inability or failure of some individuals or 
groups to acquire available information and participate in the 
political process makes it more difficult for them to ensure that 
their interests and perspectives will be addressed. Moreover, 
the relative silence of some constituents may lead public offi-
cials to ignore their most pressing concerns or underestimate 
the intensity of their preferences or the degree of various sen-
timents on issues that do make the political agenda. Finally, 
the exclusion of the vast majority of the general public from the 
political dialogue is bound to hamper the quality of public deli-
berations by limiting the number of resources that are devoted 
to our collective problems, even if each major perspective or in-
terest is represented. Accordingly, it would clearly be beneficial 
if existing disparities in political knowledge and participation 
were eliminated, as well as if the depth and quality of the in-
formation about public affairs that is provided by educational 
institutions and the media were substantially improved. None-
theless, the goal of ensuring that public officials are delibera-
tively accountable for their actions can be achieved if they pro-
vide reasoned explanations for their policy decisions and a 
sufficiently diverse range of perspectives is adequately engaged 
to inform, evaluate, and potentially contest them. This particu-
lar standard could be met even if the vast majority of the elec-
torate remained uninformed about politics or otherwise be-
haved in a less than virtuous fashion.141 
 
 140. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 141–42 (describing the 
circumstances in which “the deliberative principle of accountability justifies or 
allows deference to popular opinion”); Cohen, supra note 92, at 197 (“[W]hen 
people do appeal to considerations that are quite generally recognized as hav-
ing considerable weight, then the fact that a proposal has majority support 
will itself commonly count as a reason for endorsing it.”).  
 141. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 132–33 (“Disadvantaged 
groups have usually found representatives from within their own ranks who 
could speak for them, and who could articulate their interests and ideals, at 
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A third potential objection to deliberative accountability 
stems from its relative indifference to the electorate’s potential 
capacity to sanction public officials who make inappropriate de-
cisions.142 As previously explained, however, electoral sanctions 
are sometimes unavailable for public officials, like the Presi-
dent, who are routinely considered politically accountable.143 
Moreover, some public officials who should be expected to give 
reasoned explanations for their decisions are subject to periodic 
elections. The fact that political accountability is much weaker 
than conventional theories of public law maintain does not 
mean that elections are irrelevant or unnecessary in a democ-
racy.144 In an ideal world, the reasons that public officials pro-
vide (or fail to provide) for their decisions would strongly influ-
ence voting decisions.145 A public official’s susceptibility to 
periodic elections should therefore be one relevant factor in de-
fining her institutional responsibilities, even if modern public 
law theory dramatically overstates its importance.146 
In any event, removing a public official from office pur-
suant to an election is not the only available sanction for illegi-
timate or unpopular decisions. For example, unelected agency 
heads and federal judges are potentially subject to removal 
from office or impeachment for some misbehavior.147 Of greater 
relevance for deliberative accountability, reason-giving imposes 
a meaningful form of self-discipline upon the public officials 
 
least as reasonably and effectively as representatives of established groups.”).  
 142. See Rubin, supra note 1, at 2073 (defining accountability as “the abili-
ty of one actor to demand an explanation or justification of another actor for 
its actions and to reward or punish that second actor on the basis of its per-
formance or its explanation”); supra notes 64–67 and accompanying text (de-
scribing this aspect of the political accountability paradigm).  
 143. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.  
 144. See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text.  
 145. Cf. Rawls, supra note 92, at 769 (“When firm and widespread, the dis-
position of citizens to view themselves as ideal legislators, and to repudiate 
government officials and candidates for public office who violate public reason, 
is one of the political and social roots of democracy, and is vital to its enduring 
strength and vigor.”). For a recent reminder that we do not live in this ideal 
world, see DREW WESTEN, THE POLITICAL BRAIN (2007) (describing the domi-
nant role of emotion in processing political information). 
 146. See infra Part IV; see also GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 
146 (“To defend deliberative accountability, we do not have to deny that repre-
sentatives should attend to the claims of those who elect them.”).  
 147. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (providing that federal judges “shall hold 
their Offices during good Behaviour”); United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 
484 (1886) (recognizing the power of removal that is incident to the President’s 
power of appointment under the Constitution). 
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who are subject to this particular requirement or expecta-
tion.148 Reason-giving also subjects public officials to more fully 
informed public oversight and criticism.149 It may also provide 
a crucial basis for a legal challenge to the validity of the under-
lying decision.150 And regardless of the outcome of judicial re-
view, most of the specific policy decisions by public officials are 
open to subsequent challenge on the merits in the political 
process.151 Although most of the available avenues for respond-
ing to the decisions of public officials are pursued by other pub-
lic officials and elites rather than by ordinary citizens, the crit-
ics of earlier policy choices should also be expected to provide 
reasoned explanations of their own to mount a successful chal-
lenge to the prevailing status quo. Accordingly, the sanctions 
that are available to challenge the merits of governmental ac-
tion will continue to promote even further deliberative accoun-
tability.  
IV.  ENHANCING THE FOCUS ON DELIBERATIVE 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN MODERN PUBLIC LAW   
The foregoing observations do not mean that elections are 
meaningless or unnecessary in a democracy. Rather, as ex-
plained at the outset of this Article, periodic elections do per-
 
 148. See Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard 
Look” Judicial Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753, 761–63 (2006) (“Defenders of 
hard look review, including the courts that employ it, argue that it ensures the 
supposedly expert agency really has based its decision on a reasoned analysis 
of relevant information.”). As Stephenson explains, critics of hard-look judicial 
review vigorously dispute its purported benefits and whether they are worth 
the costs. See id. at 763–65. For a discussion of  similar issues that are raised 
about the purported benefits of written judicial opinions, see Chad M. Oldfa-
ther, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Function, 96 GEO. L.J. 
1283 (2008). 
 149. See supra text accompanying note 100.  
 150. For example, federal administrative decisions will be invalidated as 
arbitrary or capricious under the APA if an agency: 
has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, 
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered 
an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence be-
fore the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a 
difference in view or the product of agency expertise.  
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
43 (1983).  
 151. See infra note 188 and accompanying text. Because the judiciary has 
neither the power of the purse nor the sword, political officials can also con-
ceivably refuse to enforce or follow their decisions. See Friedman, Dialogue, 
supra note 21, at 643–48 (challenging the assumption that a judicial decision 
constitutes the last word on an issue). 
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form some vital functions, including holding public officials po-
litically accountable in a very general way.152 They do not 
guarantee, however, that elected officials are politically accoun-
table in a meaningful way for their specific policy decisions. If 
we really want to promote the legitimacy of government au-
thority and avoid arbitrary decisions, we need to think about 
democratic accountability in different and more sophisticated 
ways.  
This Part argues that the political accountability paradigm 
that dominates American public law should be discarded in fa-
vor of an enhanced focus on deliberative accountability. It 
proceeds to explain that this course of action would have signif-
icant implications for the proper conception of the structure of 
American democracy, which would help to resolve some of the 
most contested issues in the fields of constitutional theory, ad-
ministrative law, and legislation. Finally, it points out that a 
paradigm shift of this nature would have tangible implications 
for certain individual rights, which are illustrated by the con-
troversy over the appropriate legal treatment of same-sex mar-
riage. 
A. THE NEED FOR A PARADIGM SHIFT IN MODERN PUBLIC LAW 
This Article has explained that the prevailing paradigm of 
democratic accountability is implausible because public officials 
are not held politically accountable for their specific policy deci-
sions by periodic elections. It has also claimed that public offi-
cials can be held deliberatively accountable by a requirement or 
expectation that they give reasoned explanations for their poli-
cy decisions that could reasonably be accepted by free and 
equal citizens with different interests and perspectives. Be-
cause public law theory and doctrine should be consistent with 
reality or, at a minimum, based on legal fictions that improve 
the workings of democracy,153 this section claims that we 
should discard the political accountability paradigm as a basis 
for legitimizing specific policy decisions in favor of an enhanced 
focus on deliberative accountability. 
 
 152. See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text.  
 153. For a discussion of the use of these techniques in statutory interpreta-
tion, see Schacter, supra note 30, at 593 (identifying a new conception of dem-
ocratic legitimacy in statutory interpretation whereby the court assigns mean-
ing to a contested statutory term by using interpretive rules that are designed 
to produce “democratizing effects” that correspond to a particular image of 
democracy). 
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The Article has already established that the political ac-
countability paradigm does not comport with reality. Moreover, 
it seems unlikely that this will ever be the case without unat-
tainable increases in political knowledge and participation.154 
The only remaining question, then, is whether the fiction of po-
litical accountability serves a valuable function in public law 
theory and doctrine. Although it is worthwhile to remind un-
elected officials that they should ordinarily defer to the clear 
policy choices of elected representatives, this particular mes-
sage can be sent in better ways. The same is true of the idea 
that public officials should duly respect the ascertainable prefe-
rences of the majority. Because “political accountability” is oth-
erwise nothing more than empty rhetoric that can be used by 
one side or the other at all times and in all cases, the existing 
paradigm appears on balance to be a liability. This is especially 
true when arbitrary or otherwise unjustified decisions are pri-
vileged solely because they were made pursuant to direct de-
mocracy or by elected officials who could theoretically be held 
accountable by the voters at the next election. 
The fundamental problem with the fiction of political ac-
countability is that it does not contain a coherent stopping 
point—it tells unelected officials that they must always defer to 
the policy choices of elected representatives and the majorita-
rian preferences they embody. Meanwhile, however, the ideal of 
political accountability is moderated in our federal system by 
separated powers and checks and balances that necessarily lim-
it the extent to which governmental policies will reflect the will 
of the majority.155 Elected representatives may depart from the 
wishes of their constituents, and overcoming the hurdles of bi-
cameralism and presentment requires a supermajority.156 
Moreover, the power of judicial review can lead to the invalida-
tion of statutes that have surmounted the hurdles of the legis-
lative process.157 Because these structural safeguards are de-
signed to protect individuals and political minorities from the 
 
 154. See Somin, supra note 4, at 1325 (arguing that there is a small payoff 
to an individual for acquiring political knowledge, and as a result, political ig-
norance is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future).  
 155. See, e.g., Eule, supra note 41, at 1522–31 (providing an influential dis-
cussion of the republican safeguards against majority faction that are provided 
by the Constitution); Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 95, at 31–49 
(same).  
 156. See Manning, supra note 34, at 74–78.  
 157. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).  
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tyranny of the majority,158 they inherently conflict with the po-
litical accountability paradigm and present an insoluble coun-
termajoritarian difficulty.159 At the end of the day, the political 
accountability paradigm that currently dominates public law 
theory and doctrine is both completely unrealistic and incom-
patible with existing democratic institutions. 
Although it is difficult to say how often public officials pro-
vide reasoned explanations for their decisions that could rea-
sonably be accepted by free and equal persons with different in-
terests and perspectives, it seems plausible to believe that 
deliberative accountability is at least as prevalent as political 
accountability as an empirical matter in the modern regulatory 
state.160 Moreover, deliberative accountability is self-
consciously aspirational in nature,161 whereas political accoun-
tability is often falsely presumed to exist by modern public law 
theory. The fact that deliberative accountability and political 
accountability both fall short of their ideal levels therefore pos-
es far more difficulties for the latter theory.162 As explained 
above, political accountability is routinely presumed to be self-
enforcing, and correcting its deficiencies would require unat-
tainable increases in existing levels of political knowledge and 
participation.163 Conversely, outside enforcement mechanisms 
and structural safeguards already exist and can be further 
reinforced to facilitate greater levels of deliberative accounta-
bility in the modern regulatory state.164 Reason-giving there-
fore offers a far more promising route for ensuring that public 
officials who exercise discretionary authority can be held ac-
countable for their decisions. 
Interestingly, if reason-giving is viewed as the relevant 
mechanism of democratic accountability, the existing hierarchy 
of perceived institutional competence in modern public law 
 
 158. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.  
 159. See Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, the New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1491, 1494 (2002) (“[C]laims of liberty are often understood as assertions of 
‘trumps’ against majority decisions and thus in tension with democratic 
rule.”).  
 160. See infra notes 165–170 and accompanying text. 
 161. See, e.g., GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 357 (acknowledging 
that deliberative democracy’s “highest ideals make demands that actual poli-
tics may never fulfill”).  
 162. See id. (“The gap between the theory and practice of deliberative de-
mocracy is narrower than in most other conceptions of democracy.”).  
 163. See supra note 154 and accompanying text; supra Part I.  
 164. See infra notes 165–70 and accompanying text; infra Part IV.B.  
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would be completely reversed. The independent judiciary is 
routinely expected to provide reasoned explanations for its de-
cisions.165 Moreover, federal administrative agencies are sub-
ject to procedural safeguards, including hard-look judicial re-
view, that often compel them to provide reasoned explanations 
for their decisions as well.166 The judiciary does not ordinarily 
impose a meaningful reasoned decision-making requirement 
upon the legislature,167 but the successful enactment of a sta-
tute pursuant to the constitutional requirements of bicameral-
ism and presentment ordinarily requires lawmakers to engage 
in reasoned deliberation with their colleagues.168 There are no 
comparable structural safeguards that consistently require the 
President to give reasoned explanations for his decisions,169 but 
congressional oversight and modern media coverage may pro-
vide some selective opportunities for his policy decisions to be 
 
 165. See, e.g., John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason, in DELIBERATIVE 
DEMOCRACY 93, 108–14 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997) (charac-
terizing the Supreme Court as the “exemplar” of the type of “public reason” 
that should govern the public arena); see also Oldfather, supra note 148, at 
1285 (recognizing “longstanding conceptions of the judicial role, in which rea-
soned analysis stands as the core feature of legitimate judging”); Louis Mi-
chael Seidman, Ambivalence and Accountability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1571, 1574 
(1988) (recognizing that appellate judges are usually accountable in the sense 
that they give reasons or justifications for their decisions). 
 166. See Staszewski, supra note 38, at 443–46 (“The net result of APA pro-
cedures and ‘hard-look’ judicial review under State Farm is to encourage and 
enforce republican ideals of deliberation and reasoned decisionmaking in the 
administrative lawmaking process.”); Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 95, 
at 56–58 (describing administrative law doctrine as “classically republican” 
because of its requirements of “deliberation” and “reasoned analysis”). 
 167. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980) (recognizing the 
“presumption of constitutional validity” that is ordinarily attributed to acts of 
Congress); Phillip P. Frickey, The Communion of Strangers: Representative 
Government, Direct Democracy, and the Privatization of the Public Sphere, 34 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 421, 444 (1998) (“Federal constitutional law conclusively 
presumes that, when general legislation affects many people, the legislative 
process” meets the criteria of due process of lawmaking because it “develop[s] 
the relevant facts and legal standards so that people are not deprived of im-
portant rights or interests based on erroneous assumptions” and promotes 
“participation and dialogue by affected individuals in the decisionmaking 
process”).  
 168. See Staszewski, supra note 91, at 1018–22 (describing the reasoned 
deliberation that is facilitated in the legislative process by the constitutional 
safeguards of representation and bicameralism and presentment).  
 169. The Constitution, however, requires the President to report periodical-
ly on “the state of the union” and to provide the reasons for his objections to a 
bill that was presented to him by Congress if he returns the proposal to the 
legislature without his signature. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; art. II, § 3.  
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subject to deliberative accountability.170 For the most part, 
however, neither the voters nor the initiative proponents are 
required or expected to provide reasoned explanations for their 
particular decisions during the ballot initiative process.171 
In any event, an enhanced focus on deliberative accounta-
bility would avoid the internal contradictions of the existing 
paradigm because the structural safeguards of the lawmaking 
process can all be understood to facilitate reasoned delibera-
tion, in addition to protecting individual rights and political 
minorities.172 Representation and bicameralism and present-
ment therefore play a coherent moderating role for the ideal of 
deliberative accountability. Specifically, their existence pro-
vides a legitimate reason for one institution to defer to choices 
made by other institutions even when officials in the former in-
stitution would not otherwise have chosen a specific course of 
action.173 This explains why an emphasis on deliberative ac-
countability does not mean that courts and agencies should be 
the primary policy makers in a republican democracy. 
As indicated above, courts and agencies may very well do 
the best job of providing reasoned explanations for their deci-
sions on a regular basis. Nonetheless, when elected representa-
tives of the people successfully enact a law pursuant to the 
Constitution’s single, finely wrought, and exhaustively consi-
dered process of lawmaking, the resulting product is entitled to 
respect based on this pedigree.174 Elected officials do, moreover, 
 
 170. See, e.g., Michael A. Fitts, The Paradox of Power in the Modern State: 
Why a Unitary, Centralized Presidency May Not Exhibit Effective or Legitimate 
Leadership, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 827, 843–45 (1996) (describing the “rhetorical 
functions” performed by the modern presidency through its “public media 
role”). 
 171. See Staszewski, supra note 38, at 398 (recognizing that direct democ-
racy allows unelected citizens to make laws without structural safeguards that 
“are designed to encourage careful deliberation and reasoned decisionmaking 
in the legislative process”); Staszewski, supra note 88, at 32–39 (claiming that 
the initiative process facilitates deceptive behavior by initiative proponents 
and increases the risk that successful ballot measures will have collateral con-
sequences not intended by the voters). 
 172. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.  
 173. See Eule, supra note 41, at 1532 (recognizing that a successfully 
enacted statute necessarily “passed through an extensive filtering system,” 
characterizing the results of this process as “majoritarianism plus,” and claim-
ing that “[i]t is the plus that reflects the Framers’ unique vision of democracy, 
and it is the plus that warrants judicial caution in substituting its own judg-
ment”); supra notes 167–68 and accompanying text.  
 174. See supra note 173; see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951, 959 
(1983) (holding that the legislative veto violates the constitutional require-
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have some significant deliberative advantages over courts 
based on their access to a broader range of information and 
perspectives and their ability to engage in logrolling and to set 
their own agendas.175 Unruly as the legislative process may be, 
it is typically appropriate for courts to presume that ordinary 
legislation is constitutionally valid and to follow a version of 
legislative supremacy in statutory interpretation. The basis for 
this respect is not, however, that legislation reflects the will of 
the majority and voters will hold elected representatives ac-
countable if it does not, but rather that a statute has ordinarily 
emerged from a deliberative process that requires broad 
agreement on ways of promoting the public good.176 
The same rationale explains why administrative agencies 
are obligated to follow legislative intent when Congress has ex-
plicitly resolved a particular issue.177 Moreover, similar consid-
erations explain why courts should often defer to the policy 
choices of agencies when this is not the case.178 That said, there 
is no reason to think that the structural safeguards of lawmak-
ing are infallible. For example, statutes and regulations might 
infringe the constitutional rights of individuals or minority 
 
ments of bicameralism and presentment, and explaining that the Framers de-
cided that “the legislative power of the Federal government [could only] be ex-
ercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, 
procedure”). 
 175. See, e.g., Eule, supra note 41, at 1556 (“Legislative logrolling over a 
broad agenda brings minorities into the process and allows resulting compro-
mises to accommodate their interests.”); Marci A. Hamilton, Representation 
and Nondelegation: Back to Basics, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 807, 814 (1999) (ex-
plaining that “[b]ecause of its numbers, Congress is capable of mediating a 
great variety of interests” and “[a]s a result, it is capable of reaching more 
nuanced compromises on national issues. . . . to reach the public good”).  
 176. See Eule, supra note 41, at 1532 (recognizing that “[t]he ‘difficulty’ 
with judicial review entails its reconciliation with the constitutional version of 
democracy, not with some abstract form that exalts unfiltered majoritarian-
ism” and claiming that the countermajoritarian difficulty “would be more ac-
curately conceptualized as a ‘counter-representative’ or ‘counter-republican’ 
difficulty”); see also Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 95, at 1550 
(“The requirement of deliberation is designed to ensure that political outcomes 
will be supported by reference to a consensus (or at least broad agreement) 
among political equals.”).  
 177. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 842–43 (1984).  
 178. See Robert A. Anthony & David A. Codevilla, Pro-Ossification: A 
Harder Look at Agency Policy Statements, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 667, 677 
(1996) (“[T]he deference that courts extend to legislative rules reflects an as-
sumption that, because due opportunities for comment and deliberation have 
occurred, the product is worthy of judicial respect.”); supra note 166 and ac-
companying text. 
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groups or pose unanticipated problems when they are subse-
quently applied to unforeseen circumstances. Agencies may 
simply bow to political pressure rather than engage in reasoned 
decision making. In light of these dangers, the judiciary is in a 
good position to oversee the implementation of public law and 
to serve a legitimate checking function by reviewing the deci-
sions of the political branches. Instead of viewing judicial re-
view as a countermajoritarian force in an otherwise majorita-
rian system, this conception of the judicial role recognizes that 
the true reasons for deference to political institutions can run 
out, thereby reinvigorating the need for meaningful delibera-
tive accountability.179 From this perspective, the angst that 
public law scholars have plainly felt about the need to legitim-
ize the role of courts and agencies in our democracy would be 
better directed toward the shortcomings of deliberative accoun-
tability in the political branches of our government. From 
“earmarks” to omnibus legislation to stonewalling by executive 
branch officers, we need to find ways to encourage or require 
elected officials to give transparent, public-regarding reasons 
for their policy choices on a more regular basis.180  
In sum, the deliberative accountability paradigm is more 
realistic and internally coherent than the political accountabili-
ty paradigm that currently dominates public law theory and 
doctrine. The deliberative accountability paradigm is also more 
normatively attractive. Consistent with our constitutional tra-
ditions, it recognizes the legitimacy of setting appropriate lim-
 
 179. See, e.g., Lawrence Gene Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. 
Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REV. 
1373, 1411–12 (1978) (recognizing that judicial deference is often justified on 
the grounds “that the governmental body which has enacted a regulatory 
measure is best equipped to make judgments of policy and strategy, and fur-
ther, that the body in question can and will measure its own conduct against 
constitutional requirements” and claiming that “judicial departures from the 
tradition of deference are often justified by circumstances which impair or 
render suspect this process of legislative deliberation”).  
 180. The articulation and defense of specific reform proposals of this nature 
are beyond the scope of this Article. Heightened standards of judicial review 
for “due process of lawmaking” are one potential option, but it would certainly 
be preferable to find “political solutions” for these accountability deficits if at 
all possible. Cf. Brown, supra note 106, at 37 (recognizing that the “frightening 
specter” of imposing “substantive obligations [on] legislatures” has never 
“gained much purchase in American constitutional law” and that this is un-
likely to change); Frickey & Smith, supra note 50, at 1707–09 (claiming that 
an accurate understanding of congressional decision-making processes sug-
gests that Congress cannot satisfy a judicially imposed requirement of due de-
liberation and rational, articulated decision-making).  
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its on majority rule without ignoring the value of public opi-
nion. At the same time that it holds public officials accountable 
for their policy decisions, the deliberative accountability para-
digm also respects other fundamental democratic values, in-
cluding liberty, equality, and First Amendment guarantees, re-
gardless of the pre-political preferences of a majority. The fact 
that protecting these values is often considered undemocratic 
under the existing paradigm ought to strike us as the real diffi-
culty of democratic theory in the modern regulatory state.181 
For all of these reasons, the political accountability paradigm 
that dominates American public law should be discarded as a 
basis for legitimizing specific policy decisions in favor of an en-
hanced focus on deliberative accountability. The remainder of 
the Article explains some of the specific implications of this vi-
sion of democracy.  
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN PUBLIC 
LAW 
The adoption of a new paradigm of democratic accountabil-
ity would not necessarily require a dramatic overhaul of exist-
ing institutional arrangements in the American regulatory 
state, but an enhanced focus on deliberative accountability 
would have significant implications for some of the most vigo-
rously contested issues in modern public law theory and doc-
trine. First, we could finally move beyond the countermajorita-
rian difficulty in constitutional law by recognizing that judicial 
review does not substitute the preferences of an unaccountable 
judiciary for those of an accountable legislature. The judiciary 
and the legislature are both accountable in different ways, and 
at least when it comes to adjudicating cases or controversies 
that involve alleged violations of individual rights and the en-
forcement of limitations on governmental authority, there are 
compelling reasons to prefer the type of accountability that is 
attributable to an independent judiciary that gives reasoned 
explanations for its decisions.182 Moving beyond the counterma-
 
 181. For a theory that treats constitutional principles of liberty, equality, 
and citizenship as central to democracy, see Jane S. Schacter, Romer v. Evans 
and Democracy’s Domain, 50 VAND. L. REV. 361, 399 (1997). 
 182. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 16, at 102 (claiming that “society 
should have an institution . . . that is not popularly elected or directly electo-
rally accountable identify and protect values that are sufficiently important to 
be constitutionalized and safeguarded from political majorities” and that “Jus-
tices should openly explain and defend their value choices, and thus persuade 
observers of the best way to understand and apply the Constitution”). 
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joritarian difficulty would allow constitutional theorists to stop 
worrying about the legitimacy of judicial review and focus in-
stead on how it should be conducted. 
Second, instead of viewing the separation of powers as a 
formal commitment to a strict separation of functions or a func-
tional effort to maintain a proper balance of power among the 
original three branches,183 we should envision the entire public 
law system as what John Braithwaite has called “a checking 
and balancing circle of deliberative circles.”184 
 
Thus, (1) statutes may be enacted to address social prob-
lems pursuant to the requirements of bicameralism and pre-
sentment;185 (2) administrative agencies implement their dele-
 
 183. For a compelling argument that the conventional mechanisms for 
maintaining the separation of powers in American government are incoherent 
and unhelpful, see M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Sepa-
ration of Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603 (2001).  
 184. John Braithwaite, Accountability and Responsibility Through Restora-
tive Justice, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 11, at 33, 39–40 (compar-
ing the republican vision of separated powers with a more hierarchical vision).  
 185. See Staszewski, supra note 91, at 1026 (setting forth an understand-
ing of the legislative process whereby “statutes should have an instrumental 
purpose that promotes the common good”).  
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gated authority pursuant to the applicable procedures (with the 
potential influence and oversight of the President and members 
of Congress);186 (3) final agency action is subject to judicial re-
view for compliance with the governing law and reasoned deci-
sion making;187 and (4) a subsequent Congress and President 
can overrule earlier legislative decisions and most of the choic-
es of agencies and the judiciary.188 Not only are policy decisions 
made at each stage of this process subject to ongoing review 
and refinement by officials in other institutions, but each stage 
of the process is designed in a deliberative fashion.189 The goal, 
then, can be understood as facilitating both the checking that is 
provided by multiple institutions, as well as the deliberation 
that is conducted within each of them, to legitimize and im-
prove public policy and minimize the likelihood that private 
parties will be adversely affected by arbitrary governmental ac-
tion.  
From this perspective, the adoption of a strong version of 
the theory of the unitary executive would clearly be a mistake. 
This theory relies upon a formal separation of governmental 
functions that narrowly defines the legislative and judicial 
roles and leaves a substantial range of policy-making authority 
to the Chief Executive.190 The theory also strictly limits the ex-
tent to which the legislature and judiciary can legitimately 
check the executive’s activities through congressional oversight 
or judicial review.191 The result would be that the executive 
branch could do virtually whatever it wanted in the vast range 
 
 186. For interesting discussions of the role of administrative procedures in 
enabling legislative oversight and public-interested regulation, see Lisa 
Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1749 (2007), and Steven P. Croley, Public Interested Regulation, 28 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7 (2000).  
 187. See Abbot Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967) (establishing a 
presumption in favor of judicial review of final agency action). 
 188. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory In-
terpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991) (conducting an empirical 
study and analysis of the extent to which Congress overrules statutory deci-
sions of the Supreme Court).  
 189. See supra notes 165–68 and accompanying text. 
 190. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697–98, 704–12 (1988) (Sca-
lia, J., dissenting); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential 
Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 896–97 
(1983) (arguing that the judiciary should not interfere with the operation of 
the political branches except to protect vested individual rights).  
 191. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 25, at 50–57 (claiming that congres-
sional oversight and judicial review threaten the President’s ability to faithful-
ly execute the laws).  
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of circumstances in which it executed the law. Because the po-
litical accountability that purportedly justifies this arrange-
ment is weak, and the most readily available mechanisms for 
securing deliberative accountability would be eliminated, the 
President would, in effect, be able to do whatever he wanted. 
Not only would this result be as far removed as possible from a 
checking and balancing circle of deliberative circles (more like 
an omnipotent dot), but it would also provide a perfect recipe 
for arbitrary governmental action. 
Third, an enhanced focus on deliberative accountability 
would have clear implications for the most pressing debates in 
contemporary administrative law. Specifically, executive-
branch agencies should continue to be required to give reasoned 
explanations for their policy decisions that are subject to mea-
ningful judicial review, even when those decisions are made at 
the behest of the President. While deference is appropriate 
when agencies with expertise reach their decisions by a suffi-
ciently deliberative process, the judiciary should continue to 
ensure that an administrative agency’s exercise of delegated 
authority is supported by reasoned explanations. This means 
that (1) hard-look judicial review should continue to govern dis-
cretionary policy choices;192 (2) the second step of Chevron 
should largely replicate this analysis and therefore turn on 
whether the agency engaged in reasoned decision making;193 (3) 
the procedural safeguards that precede an agency’s interpretive 
decisions should have a bearing on whether it is entitled to de-
ference under the Chevron framework;194 (4) prior judicial in-
 
 192. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. 
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (adopting the hard-look standard of judicial re-
view); see also Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Re-
cent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 
75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 484–90 (1997) (claiming that the undesirable effects of 
hard-look judicial review are likely outweighed by its considerable benefits, 
which include “the need to ensure that agencies act not only within acceptable 
legal and political bounds, but also exercise their discretion in a deliberative 
manner”). 
 193. See Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsi-
dered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1254–55, 1263–77 (1997) (endorsing this 
approach and finding evidence of its use by the D.C. Circuit); Mark Seidenfeld, 
A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing 
Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 83 (1994) 
(“[D]eliberative democracy suggests a modification of Chevron which would 
place the emphasis on the second rather than the first Chevron step, thereby 
forcing agencies to explain why their interpretations are good policy in light of 
the purposes and concerns underlying the statutory scheme.”).  
 194. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (holding 
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terpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions should not 
trump well-reasoned agency decisions to the contrary under 
Chevron;195 and (5) the modern Skidmore standard that applies 
in most other circumstances sensibly requires the judiciary to 
evaluate the quality and degree of an agency’s deliberative ac-
countability in assessing how much respect should be accorded 
to its interpretive decisions.196 Most fundamentally, legislative 
delegations of authority to executive agencies should be un-
derstood as providing final decision-making authority to agency 
officials, rather than to the President, based on their superior 
deliberative accountability in the vast majority of circums-
tances.197 
Although the foregoing conclusions are basically consistent 
with existing judicial precedent,198 the current regulatory 
process and administrative law doctrines are by no means per-
fect. For example, the APA’s exemptions from notice-and-
 
that an agency interpretation “qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears 
that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carry-
ing the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was 
promulgated in the exercise of that authority”); id. at 227 (explaining that the 
foregoing standard will generally be met when an agency interpretation is 
rendered pursuant to formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking); 
see also Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (denying Che-
vron deference to an agency interpretation rendered in an opinion letter). 
 195. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 
U.S. 967, 982–83 (2005) (holding that a prior judicial construction only trumps 
an agency’s interpretation under Chevron if the court held that its construc-
tion was mandated by the unambiguous terms of the statute and explaining 
that a contrary rule would unnecessarily “preclud[e] agencies from revising 
unwise judicial constructions of ambiguous statutes”). 
 196. The “Skidmore factors,” which are perhaps taking on increased prac-
tical significance, provide a nice laundry-list of what it takes to achieve deli-
berative accountability: (1) thorough consideration; (2) participatory and deli-
berative procedures; (3) the application of expertise; (4) valid reasoning; and 
(5) consistent treatment of regulated parties (with reasoned explanations for 
any changes in the regulatory course). Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 
140 (1944). For an informative description of the judiciary’s application of 
these factors, see Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the 
“Modern” Skidmore Standard, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1235 (2007).  
 197. But cf. Kagan, supra note 25, at 2251, 2326–31 (“[A] statutory delega-
tion to an executive agency official . . . usually should be read as allowing the 
President to assert directive authority . . . over the exercise of the delegated 
discretion.”).  
 198. It bears noting, however, that the current status of hard-look judicial 
review and its relationship to the second step of the Chevron analysis is not 
entirely clear. See Michael Herz, The Rehnquist Court and Administrative 
Law, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 297, 308–25 (2004). The degree of respect that should 
be accorded to agency interpretations under Skidmore is also still in a great 
deal of flux. See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 196, at 1237. 
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comment rulemaking are arguably too broad because several of 
the exempted categories of decision making would substantially 
benefit from public deliberation.199 Judicial decisions that limit 
the standing of regulatory beneficiaries to challenge the validi-
ty of agency action are also problematic because they remove 
an important incentive for agencies (as well as courts) to give 
sufficient consideration to a crucial perspective in the formula-
tion of public policy.200 In addition to concerns about the dispa-
rate treatment of similarly situated parties, the presumption 
against judicial review of non-enforcement decisions is also 
problematic for essentially the same reasons.201 The potential 
advantages of regulated entities over regulatory beneficiaries 
in an unregulated administrative process and related forms of 
arbitrary decision making are likely to be exacerbated (and de-
liberative accountability undermined) by the absence of restric-
tions on ex parte contacts in informal rulemaking.202 On a 
much broader level, although White House coordination and 
review of regulatory policy making can be beneficial in various 
ways, there is a real need to consider the extent to which safe-
guards can feasibly be provided to prevent similar abuses of 
this power.203 There are no easy solutions to the foregoing prob-
 
 199. See Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency 
Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 402–03 (2007) (claiming that the case 
for procedural reform of informal agency policymaking is significantly bols-
tered by a recognition of the need for adequate consideration of the interests 
and perspectives of regulatory beneficiaries). 
 200. For a prominent example of a decision that restricts the standing of 
regulatory beneficiaries to seek judicial review, see Lujan v. Defenders of Wild-
life, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). For critical commentary, see Lisa Schultz Bressman, 
Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1657, 1692 (2004) (claiming that the Court’s standing doctrine facilitates 
faction by giving regulated entities more power to challenge agency action 
than regulatory beneficiaries and thereby making it “more likely that agencies 
will respond to private or political pressure rather than public welfare”); Cass 
R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Ar-
ticle III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 186–88, 195–96 (1992) (criticizing the Court for 
disfavoring regulatory beneficiaries in this context). 
 201. See Bressman, supra note 200, at 1692 (explaining that the nonrevie-
wability doctrine has the same negative impact as limitations on the standing 
of regulatory beneficiaries); supra note 44. 
 202. Compare Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 400–02 (D.C. Cir. 1981) 
(holding that ex parte contacts between an agency and interested parties did 
not violate the governing statute or the informal rulemaking procedures of the 
APA), with Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 51–59 (D.C. Cir. 1976) 
(invalidating regulations promulgated by an agency on the basis of undis-
closed ex parte contacts).  
 203. See, e.g., William D. Araiza, Judicial and Legislative Checks on Ex 
Parte OMB Influence Over Rulemaking, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 611, 615 (2002) 
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lems that could be fully articulated here, but recognition of the 
weaknesses of the political accountability of the President and 
the potential significance of a requirement or expectation that 
public officials give reasoned explanations for their policy deci-
sions helps to explain why we should care. 
Fourth, an enhanced focus on deliberative accountability 
would have significant implications for the appropriate metho-
dologies of statutory interpretation in other contexts. Virtually 
everyone agrees that the plain meaning of a statutory text 
should control when there is no constitutional difficulty and 
Congress explicitly resolved the relevant issue in the legislative 
process.204 Most commentators also agree that identifiable leg-
islative bargains should be enforced by the judiciary in the ab-
sence of significant constitutional difficulties.205 The advocates 
of competing interpretive methodologies tend to part ways, 
however, when it comes to resolving the seemingly unantici-
pated problems that could otherwise arise when a law is ap-
plied to particular circumstances.206 They also tend to disagree 
about when statutory ambiguity exists, and which potential 
sources of meaning should be used to resolve it.207 
 
(suggesting that external checks would be useful “to guard against potentially 
inappropriate . . . influence over the rulemaking process”); Sidney A. Shapiro, 
Two Cheers for HBO: The Problem of the Nonpublic Record, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 
853, 855 (2002) (arguing that “agencies and the White House should reveal 
private communications of central relevance” to rulemaking proceedings).  
 204. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings 
of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 
1090–91 (2001).  
 205. See Molot, supra note 36, at 31 (explaining that central tenets of tex-
ualism have resonated with mainstream judges and scholars “who generally 
accept that courts should be faithful to legislative instructions and follow laws 
enacted through bicameralism and presentment rather than make new laws 
themselves”). 
 206. See Eskridge, supra note 204, at 1090–92 (claiming that the unwil-
lingness to consider other contextual evidence when a judge discerns a plain 
statutory meaning from textual sources is an innovation of strict texualism 
“that represents a significant departure from the Court’s practice in the twen-
tieth century, and is [in]consistent with the original understandings of Article 
III”); Manning, supra note 34, at 20–27 (explaining that the contrast between 
strong purposivism and textualism only comes into play when the statutory 
text is unambiguous); Staszewski, supra note 91, at 1025–27 (explaining that 
“theoretical differences between the new textualism and civic republican un-
derstandings of the legislative process and constitutional structure lead to 
competing conceptions of the judicial role” when “legislative generality pro-
duces a problematic outcome that was unforeseen by the legislature”).  
 207. See Molot, supra note 36, at 36–39, 44–48 (analyzing the unresolved 
areas of disagreement between “aggressive textualists” and the adherents of 
other theories of statutory interpretation).  
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Generally speaking, strict textualists believe that ambigui-
ty only exists when at least two linguistically plausible mean-
ings remain after thoroughly examining a statute’s semantic 
context.208 When this occurs, courts may properly consider the 
underlying statutory purpose and other policy considerations in 
choosing from among linguistically permissible meanings, pro-
vided that they do not rely upon the legislative history to ascer-
tain what the legislature intended to achieve when it enacted 
the statute.209 The judiciary may, in turn, only exercise equita-
ble discretion or avoid absurd results when a chosen interpre-
tation reflects a linguistically permissible resolution of statuto-
ry ambiguity, or perhaps when such action is necessary to avoid 
invalidating a statute on constitutional grounds.210 Courts 
must otherwise adhere to the “plain meaning” of statutory lan-
guage even when it leads to absurd results or other highly 
problematic outcomes that were seemingly unanticipated by 
Congress.211 Odd as it may seem, this is what it allegedly 
means for courts to fulfill their constitutionally mandated role 
as “faithful agents” of the legislature.212 
An explicit motivation for textualism is a belief that policy 
decisions should only be made by politically accountable offi-
cials and that the judiciary should refrain from altering the 
balance of interests that is reflected by a statute or letting 
lawmakers off the hook by fixing their mistakes.213 As ex-
plained above, the “political accountability” of lawmakers may 
be a harmless fiction to the extent that it encourages the judi-
ciary to respect Congress’s authority when it has explicitly re-
 
 208. See Manning, supra note 33, at 2463 (claiming that statutory ambigu-
ity only exists when “a given phrase has several relevant social connotations”); 
see generally John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 70 (2006) (distinguishing textualism from purposivism on 
the grounds that textualists emphasize semantic context over policy context 
and vice versa).  
 209. See Manning, supra note 208, at 84–85 (“[W]hen a statute is ambi-
guous, textualists think it quite appropriate to resolve that ambiguity in light 
of the statute’s apparent overall purpose.”).  
 210. See Manning, supra note 33, at 2462–63 (“For textualists, the prere-
quisite for employing a contextual interpretation to avoid absurdity is the ex-
istence of a relevant and established social nuance to the usage of the word or 
phrase in context.” (emphasis omitted)); see also Manning, supra note 34, at 
115–19 (discussing Justice Scalia’s efforts to limit the absurdity doctrine to 
circumstances “in which the more natural textual meaning would pose serious 
constitutional questions under the rational-basis test”).  
 211. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.  
 212. See id. 
 213. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.  
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solved a policy question,214 but the idea that lawmakers are po-
litically accountable for their specific policy decisions becomes 
problematic when it is used as a justification to limit the judi-
ciary’s interpretive authority over questions that were appar-
ently never considered or consciously resolved in the legislative 
process. In the latter circumstances, strict reliance on the plain 
meaning of the statutory text will have a tendency to promote 
random and potentially arbitrary outcomes because the range 
of textually plausible meanings may itself be a function of hap-
penstance. When a statute’s plain meaning is deemed unambi-
guous after an examination of its semantic context, the result-
ing interpretation will also be random and potentially arbitrary 
to the extent that its policy consequences were never explicitly 
considered by the legislature or the judiciary.215 This problem is 
only exacerbated by a court’s refusal to consider a statute’s pol-
icy context when Congress was pursuing an identifiable goal.216 
The new textualism therefore ultimately promotes arbitrary 
outcomes and purports to limit the judiciary’s discretion in a 
manner that would practically guarantee that there is no polit-
ical or deliberative accountability for a substantial number of 
policy decisions that profoundly affect people’s lives.217 
The best way to avoid arbitrary governmental action and 
promote democratic accountability in statutory interpretation 
is to recognize that ambiguity exists whenever Congress does 
not explicitly resolve a particular issue in the legislative 
 
 214. See supra text accompanying notes 154–55.  
 215. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 243–44 (2d ed. 2006) (explaining that textualism poses a risk 
of “creating a law without mind” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 216. See Molot, supra note 36, at 54 (“Where judges refuse to consider sta-
tutory purposes, they make it that much harder for the people’s elected repre-
sentatives to accomplish their goals.”).  
 217. The legislature’s subsequent opportunity to amend a statute to over-
rule the judiciary’s decision could result in valuable political deliberation 
about the policy question at issue, but it would not ordinarily eliminate the 
arbitrary judicial decision that was previously rendered. It therefore seems 
preferable for the judiciary to render a reasoned decision in the first instance, 
which still allows Congress to amend the statute to reach a different outcome 
if it so chooses. Cf. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 112–16 
(1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (recognizing that Congress has the power to 
correct the judiciary’s “mistakes” in statutory interpretation, but claiming that 
“we do the country a disservice when we needlessly ignore persuasive evidence 
of Congress’s actual purpose and require it ‘to take the time to revisit the mat-
ter’ and to restate its purpose in more precise English whenever its work 
product suffers from an omission or inadvertent error” (citation omitted)). 
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process.218 A sensible way to inform this threshold determina-
tion in a deliberative democracy is to examine what elected 
representatives said in the legislative process when the statute 
was enacted.219 When ambiguity is apparent from the face of a 
statute or the problematic consequences that would otherwise 
result from a seemingly unanticipated application of the law, a 
court should consider whether the statute’s underlying purpos-
es would be served by applying it to the situation at hand and 
what effect this course of action would have on other widely ac-
cepted public values and constitutional norms.220 This approach 
would allow the judiciary to exercise the equitable discretion 
that is needed to avoid absurd results and other highly proble-
matic outcomes that were not anticipated by the legislature 
and to serve as a “cooperative partner” in the ongoing elabora-
tion of the law when elected representatives have not explicitly 
resolved a particular question.221 It would also facilitate deli-
berative accountability because courts will almost certainly 
give reasoned explanations for these particular decisions and 
elected representatives are always free to amend the law in re-
sponse. 
Finally, a better understanding of the concept of democrat-
ic accountability would call the continued legitimacy of the ex-
isting ballot initiative process into question, regardless of 
whether a political accountability or deliberative accountability 
paradigm is predominant. The initiative proponents who con-
trol the precise legal consequences of this process are neither 
politically accountable to the voters nor expected to give rea-
soned explanations for their decisions. Nor do sufficient struc-
tural safeguards currently exist to entitle the final results of 
this process to any special degree of respect.222 I have therefore 
 
 218. See Staszewski, supra note 91, at 1045 (distinguishing between 
“known imprecision” and unanticipated problems that periodically arise in 
statutory interpretation).  
 219. See Peter L. Strauss, The Courts and the Congress: Should Judges 
Disdain Political History?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 242, 250–52 (1998) (recognizing 
that the new textualism’s refusal to consult legislative history is in tension 
with a constitutional structure that is designed to facilitate reasoned delibera-
tion).  
 220. Cf. Staszewski, supra note 91, at 1047–55 (describing the general pa-
rameters of the absurdity doctrine in statutory interpretation). 
 221. See Eskridge, supra note 204, at 991 (“Academic debates about statu-
tory interpretation methodology have increasingly involved competing ‘faithful 
agent’ versus ‘cooperative partner’ understandings of the role of federal 
judges.”).  
 222. See Eule, supra note 41, at 1503, 1549–55; Staszewski, supra note 38, 
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previously advocated reforms that would help to clarify the 
specific legal consequences of proposed ballot measures for the 
voters and encourage the initiative proponents to engage in 
reasoned deliberation during the lawmaking process.223 Specifi-
cally, the judiciary could adopt substantive canons of statutory 
interpretation that would narrowly construe ambiguous ballot 
measures in certain situations to avoid potentially manipula-
tive behavior by initiative proponents and promote republican 
principles of government.224 Moreover, the same basic structur-
al safeguards that compel federal administrative agencies to 
engage in reasoned decision making when they promulgate 
regulations could be adopted in the initiative context.225 Both 
proposals could improve the political accountability of the initi-
ative process by enabling the voters to express their prefe-
rences more accurately.226 The application of an agency model 
to direct democracy would also promote deliberative accounta-
bility in this context by requiring the initiative proponents to 
consider competing perspectives and give reasoned explana-
tions for their specific policy decisions that are subject to judi-
cial review.227 In the meantime, it is important to dispel the no-
tion that the existing ballot initiative process is “democracy in 
 
at 398; supra Part IV.A (explaining the moderating role of structural safe-
guards on deliberative accountability). 
 223. See Staszewski, supra note 88, at 39–59.  
 224. See Frickey, supra note 87, at 517, 522 (advocating the establishment 
of a strong preference for continuity in the ballot initiative context based on 
republican principles of government, whereby “pre-existing law is displaced by 
the ballot proposition only when the clear text or evident, core purposes of the 
electorate so requires”); Schacter, supra note 39, at 156–61 (advocating the 
narrow interpretation of ambiguous language when it seems especially likely 
that a ballot measure was tainted by the manipulation of “highly organized, 
concentrated, and well-funded interests”); Staszewski, supra note 88, at 45–55 
(endorsing the foregoing proposals and claiming that courts should also “nar-
rowly construe ambiguous ballot measures in accordance with the campaign 
statements of their proponents”). 
 225. See Staszewski, supra note 38, at 447–59 (proposing the application of 
an “agency model” to direct democracy and explaining what this reform would 
entail). 
 226. See Staszewski, supra note 88, at 69–70.  
 227. Cf. Staszewski, supra note 38, at 459 (suggesting that such reforms 
would “encourage meaningful deliberation and reasoned decisionmaking” as 
well as “hold initiative proponents accountable for their actions during the 
lawmaking process”). The substantive canons of statutory interpretation that 
are endorsed above would also promote deliberative accountability by helping 
to clarify the specific legal consequences of proposed ballot measures (thereby 
potentially enabling reasoned deliberation about their merits) and leaving the 
resolution of collateral policy issues to more deliberative lawmaking processes. 
See Frickey, supra note 87, at 517–27; Staszewski, supra note 88, at 72. 
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its purest form,”228 and to recognize instead that it is a highly 
problematic form of lawmaking precisely because the relevant 
decision-makers are not democratically accountable in any 
meaningful way for their actions. 
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN AMERICAN PUBLIC 
LAW 
Replacing the political accountability paradigm that cur-
rently dominates American public law with an enhanced focus 
on deliberative accountability would also have tangible implica-
tions for certain individual rights in our democracy. Although 
countless examples could be offered,229 this section focuses on 
the debate over the legal status of same-sex marriage in the 
United States. Aside from its status as one of the most hotly 
contested issues of public policy, this particular example is il-
luminating for two reasons. First, the proper legal treatment of 
same-sex marriage is relatively clear under the existing para-
digm—namely, prohibition in accordance with the will of a ma-
jority. Second, an enhanced focus on deliberative accountability 
leads to a different way of thinking about the issue and perhaps 
different, or, at least more nuanced, conclusions. 
This Article has explained that the political accountability 
paradigm that dominates contemporary public law is generally 
a fiction because most voters (1) are unaware of specific policy 
issues; (2) do not have meaningful preferences regarding their 
resolution; (3) are unaware of who is responsible for various 
policy decisions; and (4) do not (and cannot) cast election ballots 
on a sufficiently finely tuned, retrospective, issue-oriented ba-
sis.230 Same-sex marriage may, however, be the exception that 
proves the rule: almost everyone is aware of this issue, and 
many citizens have strong preferences on how it should be re-
solved, an ability to attribute some responsibility for relevant 
decisions, and a propensity to vote partly on the basis of the 
foregoing preferences and information.231 Unlike most other 
 
 228. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 229. See, e.g., GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 230–345 (articulat-
ing deliberative conceptions of liberty, welfare, and fair opportunity); Cohen, 
supra note 92, at 185, 201–21 (setting forth deliberative conceptions of reli-
gious, expressive, and moral liberty). 
 230. See supra Part II.  
 231. Even this concession may give too much credit to standard notions of 
political accountability. In this regard, survey evidence of the salience of the 
issue of same-sex marriage to voters is mixed. See Tonja Jacobi, How Massa-
chusetts Got Gay Marriage: The Intersection of Popular Opinion, Legislative 
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policy issues, the existing paradigm of public law could there-
fore be applied to the legal treatment of same-sex marriage in a 
relatively meaningful and straight-forward fashion. 
From a political-accountability perspective, the recent 
wave of ballot initiatives that limit eligibility for marriage to 
heterosexual couples represents a triumph of democracy.232 
Moreover, it is entirely appropriate that legislatures through-
out the country would enact similar restrictions.233 Nor is it 
surprising that a President would advocate a constitutional 
amendment that would prevent the judiciary and state gov-
ernments from deviating from this norm.234 If it were not for 
countermajoritarian features that make it extremely difficult to 
amend the Federal Constitution, Congress and the people of 
the states may very well have enacted this proposal.235 In any 
event, again from this perspective, the federal judiciary would 
 
Action, and Judicial Power, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 219, 220–21, 223 & 
n.21 (2006) (explaining that there was no political backlash against politicians 
who supported the recognition of same-sex marriage in Massachusetts and 
concluding from an evaluation of survey evidence from Gallup and Pew that 
“[t]he salience of the same-sex marriage issue is subject to dispute, both in re-
lation to the election, as discussed, and more generally”). 
 232. See, e.g., Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P. 3d 451, 465 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2003) (“[I]t is for the people of Arizona, through their elected representa-
tives or by using the initiative process, rather than this court, to decide 
whether to permit same-sex marriages.”); Maggie Gallagher, Aloha Chorus for 
Gay Marriage Debate, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1997, at A15 (“Hawaii’s graceful, 
commonsense solution [of amending the state constitution to allow the legisla-
ture to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples] represents both a rebuke to 
power-hungry judges and an object lesson in how much better off we are when 
difficult political issues are left to the political process.”); see also Thad Kouss-
er & Mathew D. McCubbins, Social Choice, Crypto-Initiatives, and Policymak-
ing By Direct Democracy, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 949, 971 (2005) (“In the November 
2004 election, eleven states (Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Missis-
sippi, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah) considered 
defense of marriage initiatives, and they all passed.”). 
 233. See Jacobi, supra note 231, at 222 (pointing out that twelve of the 
thirteen states that recently enacted constitutional amendments to prohibit 
same-sex marriage “already had both laws banning same-sex marriage and 
state Defense of Marriage Acts, which prevented recognition of out of state 
same-sex marriages”).  
 234. See Press Release, George W. Bush, President of the U. S., President 
Calls for Constitutional Amendment Protecting Marriage (Feb. 24, 2004), 
available at http://www.politicalvideo.org/george-bush-calls-constitutional-
amendment-protecting-marriage. 
 235. See U.S. CONST. art. V. The Federal Marriage Amendment died in the 
Senate when it failed to receive the two-thirds majority required in each 
chamber of Congress to propose a constitutional amendment. See WILLIAM N. 
ESKRIDGE, JR. & DARREN R. SPEDALE, GAY MARRIAGE 39–41 (2006) (describing 
the proceedings). 
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plainly have no business interfering with the legitimate policy 
choices of the people and their elected representatives to prohi-
bit the legal recognition of same-sex marriage.236 
The most striking aspect of this perspective is that the rea-
sons for the majority’s policy choice and its resulting impact on 
minorities make very little difference. Although the judiciary 
could subject a legal prohibition on same-sex marriage to 
heightened scrutiny on the grounds that it undermines a fun-
damental right or adversely affects a suspect class,237 this 
course of action would epitomize the countermajoritarian diffi-
culty. Because the political accountability paradigm posits that 
lawmaking should reflect the will of the people and remain un-
diluted by the contrary personal preferences of politically unac-
countable judges,238 legal prohibitions on same-sex marriage 
should be adopted and upheld regardless of their substantive 
merits. 
An enhanced focus on deliberative accountability would 
fundamentally reject this type of thoughtless deference to (po-
tentially thoughtless) majoritarian preferences. The relevant 
legal and policy question would become whether prohibitions on 
same-sex marriage are justified by public-regarding reasons 
that could reasonably be accepted by free and equal citizens 
with competing perspectives. This question should, of course, 
initially be resolved in the legislative process where prohibi-
tions on same-sex marriage are initially considered. It would 
therefore become necessary for lawmakers to evaluate the com-
peting arguments regarding same-sex marriage that have been 
offered by participants in this debate and to justify their posi-
tions with reasoned explanations. 
The leading arguments against same-sex marriage have 
evolved over time as the possibility of changing the traditional 
status quo has been taken more seriously.239 The first genera-
tion of arguments relied on the traditional definition of mar-
riage to reject the possibility of a legally sanctioned union be-
 
 236. Cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 651–52 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (criticizing the majority’s decision to invalidate a state constitutional 
amendment that would prevent Colorado from taking any action to protect 
gays and lesbians and claiming that “courts (as opposed to the political 
branches)” have “no business” taking sides in a “culture war”). 
 237. See, e.g., Att’y Gen. of New York. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 906 n.6 
(1986) (describing the conventional reasons for heightened judicial scrutiny). 
 238. See supra Part I.  
 239. See ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 235, at 20–31 (describing the 
evolving opposition to same-sex marriage in the United States). 
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tween two persons of the same sex.240 Because this argument is 
obviously circular and therefore completely unpersuasive, op-
ponents of same-sex marriage have proceeded to articulate 
moral arguments against legal reform in this area. These ar-
guments are typically rooted in sincerely held interpretations of 
religious doctrine or based on an aversion toward homosexual 
persons or their behavior.241 As such, they are not, standing 
alone, public-regarding reasons for prohibiting same-sex mar-
riage that could reasonably be accepted by free and equal citi-
zens with competing perspectives. 
Partly for this reason—and the related need to convince 
relatively impartial courts and political moderates of the validi-
ty of their position—opponents of same-sex marriage have be-
gun to place greater emphasis on the consequential arguments 
that are allegedly in their favor.242 For example, they routinely 
contend that the legal recognition of gay and lesbian unions 
would be the first step down a slippery slope that would ulti-
mately foreclose legal prohibitions on minors entering into 
marriage, polygamy, incest, and even bestiality.243 Similarly, 
they claim that the legal recognition of same-sex marriage 
would destroy traditional marriage and thereby harm the in-
creasing number of children who would grow up in single-
parent families or with two cohabiting parents.244 
If these claims were consistent with the available empirical 
information and otherwise persuasive, they would count as 
 
 240. See id. at 21–22. For an example of a judicial decision that upheld the 
validity of a legal prohibition of same-sex marriage solely on these grounds, 
see Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589–90 (Ky. 1973). 
 241. See ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 235, at 23–24. For a leading 
federal decision that relies upon traditional definitions and religious authority 
to justify a refusal to recognize same-sex marriage, see Adams v. Howerton, 
486 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (C.D. Cal. 1980), aff ’d on other grounds, 673 F.2d 
1036 (9th Cir. 1982).  
 242. See ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 235, at 25–30.  
 243. See id. at 24 (describing the “slippery slope” argument and observing 
that it has “become almost boilerplate in speeches or books that oppose same-
sex marriage”). 
 244. For influential renditions of the “defense of marriage” argument 
against same-sex marriage, see G. Sidney Buchanan, Same-Sex Marriage: The 
Linchpin Issue, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 541, 565–72 (1985); Teresa Stanton Col-
lett, Should Marriage Be Privileged?: The State’s Interest in Childbearing Un-
ions, in MARRIAGE AND SAME-SEX UNIONS 152, 152–61 (Lynn D. Wardle et al. 
eds., 2003); Maggie Gallagher, Normal Marriage: Two Views, in MARRIAGE 
AND SAME-SEX UNIONS, supra, at 13, 13–24; see also ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, 
supra note 235, at 28–31 (describing the objection and explaining its contem-
porary popularity). 
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public-regarding reasons for prohibiting same-sex marriage in 
a deliberative democracy. Yet, the slippery-slope argument is 
not supported by the experience of a single jurisdiction that has 
legally recognized same-sex marriage or registered partner-
ships. An increasing number of foreign countries and a few 
states have already recognized the legality of same-sex unions, 
but there has not been any serious movement toward eliminat-
ing existing age of consent laws or prohibitions on polygamy, 
incest, or bestiality in any of those jurisdictions.245 Moreover, 
restrictions on the ability of minors to enter into marriage and 
legal prohibitions of bestiality and some forms of incest are dis-
tinguishable from the legal recognition of same-sex marriage 
and registered partnerships based on the existence vel non of 
valid consent.246 Finally, while same-sex marriage and regis-
tered partnerships recognize a mutual commitment between 
the participants, polygamy necessarily places one member of 
the relationship on a different and evidently superior footing 
and is therefore arguably distinguishable on this basis.247 
The “defense of marriage” argument is based on the under-
lying premise that “the great virtue of marriage is the creation 
of an altruistic space, where adults sacrifice their own self-
interest in the service of mutual commitment to one another 
and to children they raise together.”248 The proponents of this 
argument maintain that traditional marriage has declined be-
cause this ideal has been sacrificed by liberalizations that treat 
marriage as just another avenue for seeking self-fulfillment 
and pleasure.249 The legal recognition of same-sex marriage 
would allegedly render the liberal conception of marriage victo-
rious and constitute the proverbial straw that broke traditional 
 
 245. See ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 235, at 36, 169–72.  
 246. Cf. Brett H. McDonnell, Is Incest Next?, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 
337, 337 & n.2 (2004) (evaluating how Lawrence v. Texas affects laws regulat-
ing other forms of sexual behavior, including consensual adult incest, but ex-
pressly excluding “behavior that is not consensual or where one or more of the 
persons involved is not adult” from this inquiry); see also ESKRIDGE & SPE-
DALE, supra note 235, at 24 (distinguishing prohibitions on same-sex marriage 
from age of consent laws on the grounds that “[m]inors are not mature enough 
to consent”). 
 247. See Shayna M. Sigman, Everything Lawyers Know About Polygamy Is 
Wrong, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 101, 169 (2006) (“[I]nternational law 
has deemed polygamy an offense against equality.”); see also ESKRIDGE & 
SPEDALE, supra note 235, at 24 (distinguishing legal prohibitions on same-sex 
marriage from prohibitions of polygamy on the grounds that “polygamy is a 
terrible legal regime from women’s point of view”). 
 248. ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 235, at 29.  
 249. See supra note 244 and accompanying text. 
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marriage’s back.250 The demise of traditional marriage would, 
in turn, lead to more children being born and raised out of wed-
lock, thereby causing irreparable harm to society’s most vul-
nerable political minority.251 
This argument is analytically flawed because same-sex 
couples can, and do enter into relationships that comport with 
the traditional ideal of marriage. Although such couples cannot 
give birth to their own biological children, they could raise the 
biological children of one parent and other children obtained 
through adoption.252 And, obviously, heterosexual couples (as 
well as same-sex couples) are sometimes unwilling or unable to 
raise children; parenting is not a mandatory requirement of 
marriage.253 Moreover, the link between the liberal demise of 
traditional marriage and the legal recognition of same-sex mar-
riage is a non sequitur.254 The traditional family has declined 
primarily because of legal reforms that were designed to protect 
cohabitation and make it easier for heterosexual couples to ob-
tain divorces. Expanding the group of citizens who are eligible 
to enter into marriage would neither facilitate cohabitation nor 
make it easier to dissolve existing marriages. On the contrary, 
the legal recognition of same-sex marriage or registered part-
 
 250. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 15 (1996), reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2919–21 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]. 
 251. See, e.g., id. at 2913, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2917 (“At 
bottom, civil society has an interest in maintaining and protecting the institu-
tion of heterosexual marriage because it has a deep and abiding interest in en-
couraging responsible procreation and child-rearing.”); Gallagher, supra note 
244, at 19 (claiming that “same-sex marriage puts at risk” the basic ideal that 
“marriage is about . . . the reproduction of children and society” and “the pre-
sumption that children need mothers and fathers, and that marriage is the 
way in which we do our best to get them for children”); see also ESKRIDGE & 
SPEDALE, supra note 235, at 30 (pointing out that the defense of marriage ar-
gument draws some of its broad appeal from the underlying notion that “[t]he 
most vulnerable minority is the children, and if there is the slightest risk that 
homosexual marriage would hurt the children, that should suffice”). 
 252. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 881–82 (Vt. 1999) (canvassing data 
on the increasing number of children who are being raised by same-sex par-
ents through assisted-reproductive techniques and adoption). 
 253. See id. (concluding that the state’s asserted interest in “furthering the 
link between procreation and child rearing” was insufficient to justify denial of 
the legal benefits of marriage to same-sex couples because this statutory ex-
clusion was significantly over- and under-inclusive); HOUSE REPORT, supra 
note 250, at 2914, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2918 (“[S]ociety has made 
the eminently sensible judgment to permit heterosexuals to marry, notwith-
standing the fact that some couples cannot or simply choose not to have child-
ren.”). 
 254. See ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 235, at 180–89 (articulating a 
more fully developed version of this argument).  
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nerships would presumably increase the number of “married” 
couples, as well as the number of children who are raised by 
two parents who are married to one another.  
Not surprisingly, the defense of marriage argument is also 
questionable as an empirical matter. Proponents of the argu-
ment have claimed that the legal recognition of registered 
partnerships in Scandinavia has caused a decline in marriage 
and an increase in the number of children born and raised out 
of wedlock in those countries.255 William Eskridge and Darren 
Spedale have recently maintained, however, that this claim is 
unsupported by a close examination of the data.256 Rather, Es-
kridge and Spedale claim that the data fully supports the anal-
ysis in the preceding paragraph.257 In any event, there is no re-
putable empirical evidence that children raised by two parents 
of the same sex are worse off than children raised by two par-
ents of the opposite sex.258 Indeed, while there is reliable statis-
tical evidence that being raised by a single parent is not in the 
best interest of children,259 the benefits of having two parents 
appear to accrue to the children regardless of whether their 
parents are married.260 Accordingly, while the research is un-
 
 255. See Stanley Kurtz, The End of Marriage in Scandinavia, WKLY. 
STANDARD, Feb. 2, 2004; Stanley Kurtz, Slipping Toward Scandinavia, NAT’L 
REV. ONLINE, Feb. 2, 2004, http://www.nationalreview.com/kurtz/ 
kurtz200402020917.asp.  
 256. See ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 235, at 169–202.  
 257. See id. at 131–67, 173–79.  
 258. See Carlos A. Ball & Janice Farrell Pea, Warring with Wardle: Morali-
ty, Social Science, and Gay and Lesbian Parents, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 253, 278 
(claiming that the social science literature does not support the view that 
children raised by gays and lesbians are harmed by the sexual orientation of 
their parents); Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual 
Orientation of Parents Matter?, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 159, 160 (2001) (identifying 
certain limitations in the existing literature, but reporting that most research 
in psychology “reports findings of no notable differences between children 
reared by heterosexual parents and those reared by lesbian and gay parents, 
and that it finds lesbigay parents to be as competent and effective as hetero-
sexual parents”). 
 259. See generally SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP 
WITH A SINGLE PARENT (1994) (compiling statistical data that demonstrates 
that children who grow up with only one parent in the household have a hard-
er time making the transition from adolescence to adulthood); JUDITH WAL-
LERSTEIN ET AL., THE UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF DIVORCE (2000); Sharon K. 
Houseknecht & Jaya Sastry, Family “Decline” and Child Well-Being: A Com-
parative Assessment, 58 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 726 (1996) (comparing varying 
degrees of family decline in the United States, Sweden, Switzerland, and New 
Zealand).  
 260. See, e.g., GUNILLA RINGBÄCK WEITOFT, LONE PARENTING, SOCIOECO-
NOMIC CONDITIONS AND SEVERE ILL-HEALTH (2003) (finding that children 
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doubtedly in a preliminary state, the defense of marriage ar-
gument against same-sex marriage appears at this time to 
amount to nothing more than unwarranted speculation. 
Based on the foregoing analysis, there does not appear to 
be any valid reason for prohibiting same-sex marriage that 
could reasonably be accepted by free and equal citizens with 
competing perspectives. In other words, if gay and lesbian 
couples want to create “an altruistic space, where adults sacri-
fice their own self-interest in the service of mutual commitment 
to one another and to children they raise together,”261 why 
shouldn’t a republican democracy let them? This conclusion 
holds, moreover, without even considering the unusually strong 
interests of gay and lesbian couples who would like to enter in-
to legally valid marriages. First, such couples seek access to a 
legal right that the Supreme Court has already declared fun-
damental in our society.262 Second, they seek to be treated the 
same as heterosexual couples who can freely enter into mar-
riage.263 Third, they seek access to the multitude of rights, ben-
efits, and obligations that result from entering into a legally va-
lid marriage.264 Lawmakers in a democracy should ordinarily 
pause before adopting any policy that denies a single group li-
berty, equality, and material benefits, but such action should 
be a non-starter when no valid considerations appear on the 
other side of the ledger. 
Eskridge and Spedale have recognized, however, that the 
true reason for widespread opposition to the legal recognition of 
same-sex marriage may stem from what they refer to as “the 
politics of disgust.”265 In other words, regardless of what they 
 
raised by two cohabiting or married parents, including parents who live with a 
partner who is unrelated to the child, are better off along a variety of impor-
tant measures than children raised by “lone parents”). There is a potential 
concern, however, that cohabiting parents are more likely to split up, resulting 
in a lone-parent family. The legal recognition of same-sex marriage would, of 
course, have a tendency to alleviate this concern, in addition to increasing the 
number of children who are raised in a household with two parents. See ES-
KRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 235, at 197–99 (explaining that Weitoft’s 
study, which is heavily relied upon by some opponents of same-sex marriage, 
can be utilized to support its legal recognition).  
 261. See ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 235, at 29.  
 262. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).  
 263. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 235, at 13.  
 264. For a recent compilation of those rights and obligations under federal 
law, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-353R, DEFENSE OF MAR-
RIAGE ACT (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf. 
(identifying 1138 federal laws in which marital status is a factor). 
 265. See ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 235, at 220–28 (explaining that 
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say, many people vehemently oppose same-sex marriage be-
cause they find homosexual people or their behavior repulsive. 
Although this “disgust” is certainly not a public-regarding rea-
son for prohibiting same-sex marriage that could reasonably be 
accepted by free and equal citizens with a competing perspec-
tive, there is a less pejorative way of describing the underlying 
concern. Specifically, the concern appears to be that the legal 
recognition of same-sex marriage would eliminate a deeply felt 
need for “boundaries” that is an essential aspect of the self-
definition of certain individuals.266 Simply put, for some people, 
the legal recognition of same-sex marriage would “rock their 
world” in a particularly upsetting way. 
On one hand, this more neutral-sounding explanation for 
opposition to same-sex marriage may be a fancy way of trying 
to justify rank prejudice or the imposition of some people’s reli-
gious beliefs upon others.267 On the other hand, it also illu-
strates the potential importance of respecting the spiritual be-
liefs and cultural norms of different citizens to the extent 
reasonably possible in the formation of public policy.268 In this 
regard, Eskridge and Spedale draw an analogy between this 
opposition toward same-sex marriage and the likely attitude of 
Native Americans who have their sacred land condemned by 
the government for public purposes.269 The implication is that 
spiritual beliefs and cultural norms of this nature are real, legi-
timate, and entitled to a reasonable degree of respect from citi-
zens with fundamentally different perspectives. 
This discussion highlights the occasional difficulty of clear-
ly defining a public-regarding reason that could reasonably be 
accepted by free and equal citizens with competing perspec-
tives. It also marks a specific debate that participants in the 
controversy over the legality of same-sex marriage should be 
 
“a politics of disgust is one that is driven by . . . emotional responses,” rather 
than “rational analyses and argumentation”).  
 266. See id. at 223–25; see also MARY DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER 
(1966) (recognizing the role of boundary maintenance that is served by dis-
gust).  
 267. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Body Politics: Lawrence v. Texas and the 
Constitution of Disgust and Contagion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1011, 1048 (2005) 
(“[D]isgust-based regulatory schemes tend to sacrifice the liberties of the mi-
nority in pursuit of goals that are often not linked to the common good.”). 
 268. Cf. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 84–85 (advocating an 
“economy of moral disagreement” in which “citizens should seek the rationale 
that minimizes rejection of the position they oppose” when “justifying policies 
on moral grounds”). 
 269. See ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 235, at 224–25. 
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having.270 This debate need not be definitely resolved at this 
time, however, because there is an available compromise that 
could generate deliberative agreement on an appropriate solu-
tion. In particular, registered partnerships or civil unions 
would provide gay and lesbian couples with most of the legal 
rights, benefits, and obligations of traditional marriage. Moreo-
ver, the availability of this legal status would go a long way to-
ward equalizing the treatment that is provided to couples with 
different sexual orientations in our society and extending the 
fundamental right to “marry.” Meanwhile, it would preserve a 
meaningful boundary that is important to some people for sin-
cerely held moral or cultural reasons, and provide a basis for 
further empirical study. While these particular solutions might 
not give all the people (or any person) precisely what they 
want, that is quite often the nature of a principled, deliberative 
compromise. 
One might object that a theory that emphasizes reasoned 
deliberation about the merits of policy choices should not resort 
to pragmatic solutions that avoid difficult substantive ques-
tions. Such an objection misunderstands the position in the 
same-sex marriage debate that is indefensible. Although there 
is no valid reason for declining to extend a meaningful form of 
legal recognition to same-sex couples, there are a variety of va-
lid perspectives regarding the most appropriate solution. In-
deed, the gay rights community is split over whether “mar-
riage” itself is the most appropriate solution or whether the 
creation of a new legal partnership arrangement that is free 
from the historical “baggage” of traditional marriage would be 
preferable.271 Moreover, a majority of the general public would 
apparently prefer to recognize the legality of civil unions at 
least partly for the reasons described above.272 A well-
functioning deliberative process would therefore simultaneous-
ly reject indefensible policy choices (e.g., the anti-recognition 
position) and choose from among the remaining options by 
reaching the best available accommodation of competing views 
 
 270. The proper role of “disgust” or boundary maintenance in the law is the 
subject of an incipient literature. See Courtney Megan Cahill, Same-Sex Mar-
riage, Slippery Slope Rhetoric, and the Politics of Disgust: A Critical Perspec-
tive on Contemporary Family Discourse and the Incest Taboo, 99 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1543 (2005).  
 271. See ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 235, at 17–18.  
 272. See AM. ENTER. INST. IN PUB. OPINION, ATTITUDES ABOUT HOMOSEX-
UALITY & GAY MARRIAGE 27–28 (2004) (reporting survey results that consis-
tently favor civil unions over legal recognition of same-sex marriage).  
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and interests under the circumstances—which could ultimately 
reflect the majority’s apparent preferences. 
Thus far, this section has concluded that a well-functioning 
deliberative lawmaking process would lead to the adoption of 
registered partnerships or civil unions for same-sex couples at 
this time. Nonetheless, with a few exceptions, this is not what 
has occurred to date in the United States.273 Instead, most 
states have enacted ballot initiatives or other laws that prec-
lude the legal recognition of same-sex marriage and appear to 
foreclose the creation of registered partnerships or civil unions 
as well.274 What is the appropriate role of the judiciary when 
reasoned deliberation on an important policy issue has so evi-
dently failed within democratic lawmaking institutions? 
This is, of course, a very hard question that lies at the crux 
of public law in a democracy. My view is that it would not be il-
legitimate for courts to invalidate legal prohibitions of same-sex 
marriage on constitutional grounds in light of the preceding 
analysis. This is particularly true when those laws were 
enacted pursuant to ballot initiatives, where the deliberative 
shortcomings of the lawmaking process are so readily appar-
ent.275 On the other hand, judicial decisions of this nature need 
not require state officials to recognize the legality of same-sex 
 
 273. See Peter Hay, Recognition of Same-Sex Legal Relationships in the 
United States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 257, 257 (2006) (“So far, only Massachusetts 
permits same-sex marriage, Vermont and Connecticut provide for ‘civil un-
ions,’ some states provide for registered domestic partnerships, and a number 
of other states extend benefits to domestic partners, without however giving 
that partnership a particular legal status.”). The Supreme Court of California 
recently held that its state Constitution guarantees the basic civil right of 
marriage “to all individuals and couples, without regard to their sexual orien-
tation.” In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 427 (Cal. 2008) (emphasis added); 
see also Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A. 2d 407, 418 (Conn. 2008) 
(holding that state laws that restricted civil marriage to heterosexual couples 
violated the equal protection rights of same-sex couples under the state consti-
tution). The California decision was recently overruled by the enactment of 
Proposition 8 pursuant to the ballot initiative process. See Gay Rights Hit 
Hard at Polls, NEWSDAY, Nov. 6, 2008, at w17.  
 274. See supra notes 232–33 and accompanying text; see also Hay, supra 
note 273, at 276 (“[S]tate law in some forty states, by statute, constitutional 
provision, or judicial interpretation of existing marriage laws forbids same-sex 
marriage or civil union and denies recognition to such relationships formalized 
elsewhere.”).  
 275. For arguments that the validity of ballot initiatives of this nature 
should be reviewed more stringently than ordinary legislation by the courts in 
circumstances of this nature, see Eule, supra note 41, at 1558–59; and Hans A. 
Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not “Republican Government”: The 
Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19, 21 (1993). 
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marriage. Rather, the court could invalidate legal prohibitions 
on same-sex marriage or restrictions on the benefits and obliga-
tions of marriage to opposite-sex couples, and “remand” the 
matter to the legislature for additional deliberation on the ap-
propriate remedy.276 This approach, which was followed in 
Vermont,277 would simultaneously reverse the “burden of iner-
tia” that makes it difficult to enact new legislation that dramat-
ically changes the status quo (even when it is supported by a 
majority—as may be the case for civil unions),278 facilitate rea-
soned deliberation among interested citizens and lawmakers 
regarding the best available solution, and perhaps lead to the 
legal recognition of civil unions instead of same-sex mar-
riage.279 As explained above, this is the solution that should 
probably have emerged from a well-functioning deliberative 
lawmaking process in the first place. 
Indeed, the same-sex marriage controversy illustrates one 
of the greatest benefits of judicial review from the standpoint of 
deliberative accountability. If everyone knows that the prefe-
rences of a majority will ultimately prevail regardless of the va-
lidity of the underlying reasons for a policy decision, some par-
ticipants in the lawmaking process would have little incentive 
to engage in reasoned deliberation with their opponents on par-
ticularly divisive issues.280 If, however, everyone knows that 
the validity of the resulting decision will be subject to a form of 
judicial review that evaluates the strength of the underlying 
reasons for a decision, proponents of competing positions will 
have incentives to set forth public-regarding reasons for their 
views as persuasively as possible.281 When no persuasive rea-
 
 276. See ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 235, at 238–39 (advocating an 
incremental approach to the legal recognition of same-sex marriage, but en-
dorsing the approach taken by the Vermont Supreme Court).  
 277. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886–88 (Vt. 1999).  
 278. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.  
 279. Cf. Jacobi, supra note 231, at 239 (claiming that by remanding its de-
cision to invalidate the state’s legal prohibition of same-sex marriage to the 
legislature, the Massachusetts Supreme Court was able to give lawmakers an 
incentive to provide legal recognition to civil unions and reduce public opposi-
tion to same-sex marriage). 
 280. See John Ferejohn, Instituting Deliberative Democracy, in DESIGNING 
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 75, 94 (Ian Shapiro & Stephen Macedo eds., 2000) 
(“[D]eliberation takes place against a background of common understandings 
about what will occur following the formation of, or the failure to form, a deli-
berative consensus.”).  
 281. Hard-look judicial review of agency decisions can be understood in a 
similar fashion. Cf. Seidenfeld, supra note 95, at 1541–50 (explaining that 
from a civic republican perspective, judicial review of administrative action 
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sons for a given policy choice exist, it should be invalidated by a 
court that gives a reasoned explanation for its decision. This 
practice promotes deliberative accountability at several stages 
of the American public law system.  
  CONCLUSION   
In addition to demonstrating some of the tangible implica-
tions of a shift in the prevailing paradigm of democratic ac-
countability, the same-sex marriage controversy illustrates a 
broader point about the way in which claims about political ac-
countability are regularly employed in modern public law. In 
particular, the idea that policy decisions are legitimated solely 
by virtue of the fact that they were enacted pursuant to direct 
democracy or by elected representatives and therefore presum-
ably reflect the majority’s will typically plays a rhetorical func-
tion that avoids (and may be designed to avoid) the need to jus-
tify the underlying policy on the merits. If legal prohibitions on 
same-sex marriage are indefensible on the merits, the best 
available strategy for defending this policy may be to change 
the subject to the widely recognized need to respect the will of 
the people by deferring to the choices of politically accountable 
officials. Even when a policy choice is debatable, the advocates 
of the prevailing policy may prefer to rest their case on the 
need to defer to the legitimate choices of a majority, rather 
than engage with their opponents in a mutually respectful dis-
cussion of the substantive merits of an issue. In short, advo-
cates of the political accountability paradigm may invoke this 
rhetoric as a strategic substitute for defending the merits of a 
policy decision, which they undoubtedly favor on other 
grounds.282 The irony is that while reason-giving is often criti-
cized as a mechanism of accountability because participants in 
the lawmaking process may not give candid reasons for their 
positions, arguments for political accountability are often pre-
text for what is truly motivating a discretionary policy choice. 
Nonetheless, pretextual arguments can often be debunked 
through a process of reasoned deliberation. In this spirit, this 
 
“would become a meaningful dialogue between court and agency in which the 
court stands in for the knowledgeable citizen that the agency must persuade to 
accept the regulatory policy”); supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
 282. Cf. Friedman, Academic Obsession, supra note 21, at 156–57 (claiming 
that “the countermajoritarian difficulty that obsesses the legal academy is not 
some timeless problem grounded in immutable truths” but rather “it 
represents—as it almost always has—a need to justify present-day political 
preferences in light of an inherited intellectual tradition”). 
 1326 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:1253 
 
Article has explained that elected officials are not politically ac-
countable for their specific policy decisions in the manner that 
is typically envisioned by contemporary public law theory. 
Moreover, it has claimed that public officials in a democracy 
can be held deliberatively accountable for their decisions and 
developed an alternative paradigm. Finally, it has argued that 
the deliberative accountability paradigm should be made pa-
ramount in American public law and explained some of the 
theoretical and doctrinal implications of doing so. Most notably, 
discretionary policy decisions in a democracy would need to be 
defended on the merits, rather than by relying upon rhetoric 
about the need to defer to the decisions of officials who are “po-
litically accountable”—which, as we have seen, is mostly false.  
 
